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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Energy Resources, Conservation and Development Commission 
(Energy Commission) is one of the youngest of California•s major 
state agencies. Created by the 1974 Warren-Alquist Act, it began 
operating in the early months of 1975. Significantly, , the new 
Commission was not the result of an amalgamation or reorganization 
of existing state departments. Its responsibilities were truly 
new and its very existence was the result of a vigorously debated 
decision made jointly by a Republican governor and a Democratic 
legislature. Its basic charge was fourfold: to forecast electrici-
ty demand; to prescribe electricity conservation measures; to pro-
mote the development of new technologies for generating electrici-
ty; and to approve sites for new power plants. 
To carry out its assigned tasks, the Commission was assigned 
some duties whtch can be described as "administrative•• and others 
which can be described as "regulatory". 
ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES 
Biennially, the Commission is required to prepare an 
initial or preliminary forecast which identifies elec-
trical energy demands within each utility service area 
over 5-, 12- and 20-year periods. 
The Commission is required to propose various electricity 
conservation measures, such as residential and non-resi-
dential building standards, efficiency standards for 
I 
heating, air conditioning and other appliances, insula-
tion standards, load management programs, etc. 
The Commission is required to promote the development 
of new technologies for electricity generation, such as 
solar, wind, biomass, and geothermal. 
REGULATORY DUTIES 
The Commission is required to adopt a final energy fore-
cast after appropriate public debate and critique of the 
initial forecast. 
The Commission is required to adopt conservation regula-
tions after appropriate public debate and critique of 
its proposed regulations. 
The Commission is to approve new power plant sites after 
appropriate public debate and critique of sites proposed 
by utilities. 
The four fundamental responsibilities of the Commission are 
clearly synergistic. Conservation programs and new energy tech-
nologies are intended to reduce electricity demand and consequently 
reduce the number of conventional new power plants needed within 
California. When a utility does claim a need for a new facility, 
however, the Commission's forecast will validate that claim and 
the siting procedure will provide an orderly and expeditious de-
cision on the most appropriate location for the facility. 
It is axiomatic, however, that new institutions seldom per-
form e~actly as their planners anticipated. Contingencies and 
II 
circumstances, unforeseen and unforeseeable at the inception of 
a new agency, inevitably affect its subsequent performance. In 
short, now that the Energy Commission has had four years of oper-
ating experience, prudent administration of the public's business 
requires an evaluation of its initial performance. The responsi-
bility for th~t evaluation falls inescapably on the Legislature--
because the Legislature was the principal architect of the Warren-
Alquist Act and because only the Legislature can initiate change 
in the st~tute which regulates and directs the Commission's activi-
ties. 
Assembly Concurrent Resolution 177 (Resolution Chapter 145, 
Statutes of 1978) established the Joint Legislative Committee on 
Energy Policy and Implementation for the express purpose of evalu-
ating the Energy Commission's performance and reporting the re-
sults of that evaluation to the appropriate standing committee 
of each House of the Legislature. The staff of the Joint Commit-
tee hereby summarizes the major points of its evaluation and sub-
mits that evaluation to the Joint Committee for use in reaching 
its final decision. Accompanying this general summary is a com-
plete staff report containing detailed findings, conclusions, data 
and examples which are not appropriately included in a summary 
document. 
FINDINGS 
I. THE COMMISSION'S PERFORMANCE 
1. The basic insight of the architects of the Warren-Alquist 
I I I 
Act was, and remains, sound. The four major responsibili-
ties identified in the Act--viz. forecasting, conservation, 
development of alternative energy sources and locating new 
energy facilities--are essential ingredients in any program 
that seeks to manage electricity growth in California. 
2. The Energy Commission's conservation programs have been 
significant factors in reducing the historical rate of 
increase in demand for electrical energy. Its innovative 
forecasting methodology has substantially increased the 
accuracy of determining future demand for electricity. 
3. The Energy Commission, with the cooperation and support 
of California's utilities, has taken the initiative in 
successfully proposing legislation to eliminate signifi-
cant shortcomings in Commission procedures for locating 
power plant sites (SB 1859-Chapter 1013, Statutes of 1978}. 
The intent of the new legislation is to limit the issues 
which can be raised and debated as part of individual 
power plant siting decisions. For example, when SB 1859 
is fully implemented, the adequacy of the biennial energy 
demand forecast and the fuel types and technologies avail-
able for new power plants will be determined by special 
••generic" proceedings conducted prior to the siting pro-
ceedings. 
4. Public participation in energy management decisions has 
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been facilitated by the Commission's unique office of 
Public Advisor--an office whose major task is to assist 
concerned members of the public in coping with formal 
Commission procedures. 
DEFICIENCIES IN COMMISSION OPERATIONS 
1. Although the architects of the Warren-Alqui~t Act were 
correct in identifying the four major responsibilities 
involved in managing electricity growth {viz. forecast-
ing, conservation, development of alternative energy 
sources and site location), they overlooked the inherent 
conflict involved in assigning all four responsibilities 
to a single commission which would exercise both admin-
istrative and adjudicatory authority. This conflict is 
rooted in the fact that developing a proposed forecast, 
reviewing a proposed power plant site, proposing conserva-
tton requirements and energy sources--are all 11 line agen-
cy11 responsibilities. There is, however, an adjudica-
tory role in making a final decision to adopt a fore-
cast, to approve a power plant site or to adopt conser-
vation regulations. This adjudicatory role is not com-
patible with the line agency role. 
Adopting a final forecast of electricity demand, for 
example, is an adjudicatory responsibility which requires 
fair, dispassionate judgment among competing claims. 
At present, however, individual Commissioners participate 
v 
actively in the development of the proposed forecast. 
The same Commissioners are then required by statute to 
adjudicate criticisms of the proposed forecast--from 
whatever sources, conservation groups, utilities, environ-
mental groups, etc.--before formally adopting the fore-
cast. In short, existing law seems to assume that Com-
missioners can totally disengage themselves from their 
own work product to the extent that they can be dispas-
sionate, uninvolved judges of that work product. 
2. Annually, an increasing amount of the Commission•s per-
sonnel and budgetary resources are being committed to 
its adjudicatory responsibilities. The Commission•s 
own calendar, in fact, indicates significantly more time 
allocated to regulatory activities than to administra-
tive ones. This trend is not unique to the Commission; 
in fact, it seems invariably to occur whenever adjudica-
tory and administrative responsibilities are assigned 
to a single agency. In the case of the Commission, 
however, if the trend is not reversed, conservation and 
alternate energy development programs are likely to be 
significantly blunted as Commission attention focuses 
increasingly on regulatory duties. 
3. An additional shortcoming which emerges from assigning 
line agency responsibilities to a commission is that 
individual Commissioners tend to assume responsibility 
VI 
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for particular line agency pr~grams {e.g., developing 
the proposed forecast, promoting alternative energy 
sources such as solar, etc.). Naturally enough under 
such circumstances, the Commissioner begins to direct 
the staff which ts associated with "his" or "her" pro-
gram. The result is uncertainty in the agency's chain 
of command and uncertainty in the executive director's 
statutory authority to direct and employ staff resources. 
4. The assignment of line agency responsibilities to a com-
mission also permits the Governor to avoid establishing 
any policy about electricity use in California and to 
avoid advocating any specific positions on important 
electricity management decisions. In the case of fore-
casting electricity demand, for example, the Governor 
does not have to identify the state policies and other 
assumptions which he believes are realistic bases for 
determining demand. Instead, · the statute assigns this 
duty to five commissioners who, by virtue of their term 
appointments, are not directly accountable to the Gover-
nor. Current criticism may well be true that guberna-
torial positions on electricity management issues are 
difficult to discern or discover. Existing law, however, 
does not require a Governor to take any such positions 
and, in fact, rather invites him not to do so. 
5. In spite of the procedural improvements mandated by 
VII 
SB 1895, there is no point in the electrical energy 
management process at which a utility's overall resource 
plan is reviewed. Such a review could be mutually bene-
ficial to the state, to the utilities themselves, and 
to various groups who today find themselves in an adver-
sary relationship to utilities on specific si~e loca-
tion decisions. Such a review would provide all groups 
with an early forum in which to debate the reasonable-
ness of the entirety of a utility's resource plan. 
Most important, this debate would take place in advance 
of a utility's request to site a specific power plant. 
The unfortunate aspect of existing law is that debate 
on the reasonableness of a resource plan is forced to 
occur within the context of procedures to designate a 
site for a proposed power plant. By the time the site 
designation process occurs, a utility is sufficiently 
committed to a particular facility that, as a practical 
matter, a reasonable examination of alternatives is 
severely limited. 
If utility resource plans are subjected to an initial, 
11 preliminary" approval procedure, debate about alterna-
tives would occur before a utility has made an irrevo-
cable business commitment to a specific facility. More-
over, the specific power plants identified in an "ap-
proved11 resource plan could be located expeditiously 
VIII 
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w~en t~e time for their construction occurred by limit-
ing t~e scope of the siting procedure. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Department of Energy The Warren-Alquist Act accurately 
identifies the critical line agency components of a 
state program to manage electricity growth. Responsi-
bility for these line agency activities, however, should 
not be assigned to an adjudicatory commission, but rather 
to a true line agency--a Department of Energy. 
Such an institutional reorganization would ensure the 
development of responsible state positions on electricity 
growth policy and on individual power plant siting de-
cisions. The Department Director, and ultimately the 
Governor, would be directly responsible for policy po-
sitions. Most important, the validity of Department 
positions would be tested in an adjudicatory proceeding 
conducted by a body which has not been directly involved 
with, or committed to, development of the positions 
themselves. 
2. Energy Commission The Warren-Alquist Act has accu-
rately identified the need for adjudication procedures 
in any state program to manage electricity growth. 
Specifically, the decision establishing a final, state-
IX 
approved electricity demand forecast, the decision iden-
tifying available fuel types, decisions adopting final 
conservation regulations, and decisions involving indi-
vidual power plant locations--all require adjudication 
by as impartial a body as possible. The Energy Commis-
sion and its adjudicatory staff should be retained to 
perform this vital function. The Commission should no 
longer be responsible for any line agency functions 
which would cloud its adjudicatory impartiality. These 
functions, together with the current Commission's line 
agency staff positions would be transferred to a new 
Department of Energy. 
3. Resource Plans In order to facilitate the siting of 
needed new electrical generating facilities, one new 
step should be required in the state's electricity growth 
management process. At present, that process involves 
three steps: (1) an official state forecast of elec-
tricity demand; (2) an official state determination of 
the fuel alternatives available for new power plants; 
and (3) individual power plant site designation. A large 
gap exists between the first two steps of the process 
and the final site designation. A utility, for example, 
may know that a new facility is justified by the elec-
tricity forecast. It also knows the fuel types it may 
choose to use for that facility. Currently, however, 
X 
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it must watt until the siting phase of the process to 
receive any indication whether the general location, 
timing, specific fuel type, or capacity of a proposed 
new facility is reasonable. 
A new procedural step is needed. Once the state has 
adopted an electricity demand forecast and has desig-
nated the fuel types generally available for new power 
plants, utilities should be required to submit their 
resource plans to the Energy Commission for review and 
approval. Such submission would trigger an adjudicatory 
process in which the utility, the Department of Energy, 
consumer groups, environmental groups, and others could 
review and debate the reasonableness of the entire re-
source plan. Once such a plan had been approved, a util-
ity could, and should, receive an expedited decision on 
a siting proposal consistent with that plan. 
This approach would focus debate on the truly pivotal 
point in an electricity supply management process--viz. 
a utility's resource plan. It would provide both the 
opportunity and the means to develop and validate con-
tingency plans for a number of alternatives for meeting 
future electricity demand. Those facilities which time 
and circumstances proved most practicable could then be 
selected for construction as they were needed. 
XI 
(Under this approach, a utility could still request 
approval of a facility not included in an "approved•• 
resource plan. Expedited siting for such a facility, 
however, should not, and would not, be applicable.) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Assembly Concurrent Resolution (ACR) 177 (Resolution 
Chapter 145, Statutes of 1978) created the Joint Committee on 
Energy Policy and Implementation. ACR 177 requires the Joint 
Committee to submit to the Legislature its analysis of the "cur-
rent effectiveness of the State Energy Resources Conservation 
and Development Commission" (Commission} and alternatives for 
reorganizing the Commission to provide for 11 increased clarity 
and cohesion in establishing state energy policy and implementing 
such policy". Among the alternatives which the Joint Committee 
must consider are: 1) reorganizing the Commission; 2) replacing 
the Commission with a new or alternate state agency; 3) reallo-
cating the state's energy-related functions among the Commission, 
the Public Utilities Commission, the State Air Resources Board, 
the California Coastal Commission, and the State Water Resources 
Control Board. ACR 177 also created an Advisory Committee to 
make recommendations on these alternatives as well as other 
alternatives the Advisory Committee chose to consider. 
This report sets forth the staff's analysis and recommenda-
tions concerning alternatives for reorganization and is intended 
to provide a basis for the Joint Committee's recommendations to 
the Legislature on the reorganization of the state's energy-
related functions. 
The report is divided into five parts: 
1) Findinqs and recommendations. 
1 
2} A history of the Warren-Alquist Act. 
3} A description of the Energy Commission's functions 
and its relations with other state agencies 
4} A discussion of the Advisory Committee's activities. 
5} The staff analysis of the Commission's effectiveness 




Policy and Planning 
o The basic insight of the architects of the Warren-Alquist 
Act was, and remains, sound. The four major responsi-
bilities identified in the Act--viz. forecasting, . conser-
vation, development of alternative energy sources and 
locating new energy facilities--are essential ingredients 
in any program that seeks to manage electricity growth in 
California. 
o However, despite the passage of the Warren-Alquist Act, 
California energy policy is not well articulated and it 
lacks clarity. 
o State agencies with primary energy-related authority, the 
Commission, the Air Resources Board, and the Public 
Utilities Commission, frequently pursue policies that 
are not well coordinated and may often conflict with one 
another. 
o California's energy planning activities have failed to 
provide the necessary guidance to the public and private 
energy producers and the people of California. 
o Although substantial improvements have been made to 11 open 11 
the energy planning process, there is no greater certainty 
and coordination in the energy planning process today tha n 
existed prior to the creation of the Commission. 
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o The Commission's practical ability to implement alterna-
tives to a proposed plant is severely limited. This 
limited flexibility is exacerbated by the fact that in 
order for the Commission to meet its statutory obligation 
to provide adequate power as indicated by the adopted 
forecast, all of the plants proposed in recent utility 
resource plans must be approved. 
o The Energy Commission, with the cooperation and support 
of California's utilities, has taken the initiative in 
successfully proposing legislation to· eliminate several 
significant shortcomings in Commission procedures for locating 
power plant sites (SB 1859-Chapter 1013, Statutes of 1978). 
The recent agreement between the ARB and the Commission 
may provide added clarity in the siting process. 
o Recent changes notwithstanding, with its current structure 
of energy responsibilities, California will be unable to 
provide a clear, coherent, and credible energy decision-
making process. 
Administration and Regulation 
o Combining administrative and regulatory processes in one 
agency reduces the credibility of the regulatory process. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, for a member of the 
Commission to advocate the use of a particular fuel 
(i.e., coal, oil, or nuclear) and subsequently remain 
impartial and objective in a specific siting case. 
4 
o The combination of regulatory and administrative processes 
reduces the coherence of program administration and 
increases the difficulty of adequately deploying staff 
resources. The practical effect of combining these 
processes is that the regulatory activity becomes dominant 
at the expense of programs to develop future new energy 
sources. 
Accountability 
o The present state energy decision-making structure does 
not provide sufficient clarity in assigning responsibility 
for decisions. 
o Several different state agencies are involved in solar 
energy and conservation programs making it difficult to 
place responsibility for those programs and making 
effective public participation nearly impossible. 
o It is well established that plural .bodies (Energy 
Commission and the Public Utilities Commission) generally 
cannot provide for the political accountability necessary 
to insure responsibility to the public. 
o When the Governor has seen the need for new energy programs, 
he has used a line agency form of organization. 
Organizational Issues 
o Staff directions have come from the Chairman of the Commission 
as well as individual Commissioners with the result that 
staff efforts are not well managed. 
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o The lack of coordination between various agencies has 
resulted in a highly inefficient regulatory and planning 
process for meeting future energy needs. 
o The present role of the Chairman as staff director has 
made unclear the role of the Executive Director. 
Alternatives Development 
o The Legislative Analyst and the Auditor General have noted 
serious deficiencies in the Energy Commission•s Research 
and Alternatives Development Program. 
o The result of an ill-defined alternatives development 
program may be the continued reliance on fossil fuels 
for power plants. 
o The Energy Commission•s conservation programs has been a 
significant factor in reducing the historical rate of 
increase in demand for electrical energy. There is, 
however, some concern over the open-ended nature of the 
Commission•s conservation mandate. 
Public Participation 
o Public participation in energy management decisions has 
been facilitated by the Commission•s unique office of 
Public Advisor--an office whose major task is to assist 





o The present Commission structure should be substantially 
altered. The present regulatory and administrative 
processes should be divided between a Commission and a 
Department of Energy. 
o The Commission's responsibilities should be limited to 
the regulatory process. Its primary functions should be 
adjudicating forecasts, resource plans, powar plant 
siting proposals, and conservation regulations. It 
should have a limited staff to perform these functions. 
o The authority of th.e Energy Commis.sion to overri.de 
standards set by state and local ag-enci"es shauld be 
reaffirmed by the Legislature. 
o The new Department of Energy should be responsible for 
the preparation of the Biennial Report, the development 
of long-range electrical and gas forecasts, development 
and promotion of conservation and alternative re$ources, 
participating as an advocate in the proceedings of the 
Commission and Public Utilities Commission and providing 
technical and engineering analyses to the Commission and 
to all other relevant state agencies. 
o The Commission should be required to approve utility 
developed resource plans indicating general location, 
timing, fuel type, and capacity of new generating 
facilities. 
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o The Public Resources Code should be amended to require 
all relevant agencies (ARB, PUC, SWRCB, etc.) to provide 
initial determinations, within a specified time, of 
feasibility and policy consistency on proposals in the 
Biennial Report and the power plant siting cases. This 
would have the effect of placing existing agreements like 
that between the ARB and the Commission into law. 
o The existing electrical surcharge should be retained as 
a funding source for both the new department and the 
Commission. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study is to set forth the most appropriate 
way of organizing the state's energy-related responsibilities. 
The first step is to examine the current organizational structure. 
This study will demonstrate that the current structure is 
deficient in several areas. It has not produced a clear and 
understandable energy policy; the . planning process is confused, 
uncoordinated, and fractured; it is difficult to assign responsi-
bility for energy decisions and planning duties. Internally, the 
Commission lacks clear staff direction and the roles of Commissioners 
and staff are confused. The Warren-Alquist Act has combined the 
regulatory and ~dministrative responsibilities in one agency, 
8 
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regulatory process. 
A review of these problems and the proposed solutions leads 
to four major questions: (1) Why retain the Commission at all? 
(2) Should the PUC assume the Commission's functions? (3) Why not 
simply make minor adjustments in the roles of the staff and 
Commissioners to correct the problems which this study points out? 
1 (4) Why create a Department of Energy? 
Why Retain the Commission? 
Elimina~ing the Commission would not eliminate the need for 
a plural body to make the case-by-case decisions on power plant 
siting, adoption of a forecast, or conservation regulations. 
These issues require an open forum for debate where parties of 
differing views can present their arguments before a body of 
dispassionate judges. A plural body allows for a broad repre-
sentation of views and the interplay of various interests. Since 
these issues require final decisions on large societal invest-
ments, a plural body may provide for the necessary consensus to 
allow decisions to be made with some degree of public acceptance. 
The Commission should be retained to perform the regulatory 
responsibilities for energy use and development. The Commission's 
responsibilities should be limited to the disposition of these 
issues; administrative responsibilities should be removed. 
The Commission's duties would be the adjudication of power 
plant siting cases to determine questions of fact regarding 
need, environmental suitability, economic feasibility, and other 
9 
related issues. The Commission•s duties would extend to the 
adoption of an electrical demand forecast to determine the level 
of future need. In adopting the forecast, the Commission would 
review the evidence and arguments of the utilities, the Department 
of Energy, and any other interested party. The Commission would 
also be responsible for the approval of an electrical resource plan. 
(This proposal will be discussed in more detail in this section 
of the report.) Resource planning would require the state's 
utilities to submit their proposed plans to the Commission and 
Department, subsequent to the adoption of the forecast. The 
plans would undergo review and would be challenged by other 
proposals or comments from the Department of Energy and others. 
The consideration of conservation standards and other regulations 
would also be the responsibility of the reorganized Commission. 
In all these activities, the Commission is to act in a ju-
dicial manner, providing an open forum for debate and an atmos-
phere where evidence can be weighed and judgment applied to 
specific cases. Its primary function would be to make decisions 
on particular issues which require a wide range of views and 
where various interests are affected by proposed actions. Thus, the 
role of the Commission would be limited to quasi-judicial responsi-
bilities needed to satisfy the regulatory process. 
Should the PUC Assume the Commission•s Functions? 
It has been proposed that the PUC assume the responsibility 
for these regulatory activities. This would still enable 
decisions to be made by a plural body and would consolidate other 
10 
functions now performed by the PUC with those of po~er plant 
siting and forecasting. 
There are, however, several reasons for not moving these 
responsibilities to the PUC. First, the PUC is not staffed to 
perform these functions and would be required to recruit or 
transfer from the Commission many indtviduals of varied disci-
plines. This would undoubtedly be accompanied with the usual 
11 Start-up problems ... Second, there are several power plant 
proposals moving through the regulatory process at the present 
time. If the regulatory process is disrupted, decisions on these 
plants may be delayed or be inadequately reviewed and fail to 
meet possible subsequent legal challenges. Third, many of the 
present difficulties are the result of poor coordination in 
both planning activities and the regulatory processes. These 
may be exacerbated by having a regulatory process in San 
Francisco and an administrative process in Sacramento. (This 
assumes the creation of a department. If all present functions 
now held by the Commission are given to the PUC, many of the 
noted problems will continue.) Finally, the Puc•s long tradition 
of rate regulation may dominate a process which must consider and 
balance environmental, economic, and social considerations. 
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Wh_y not make minor adjustments to th.e present system? 
It may also be argued that the present structure ts sound--
all it needs is some 11 fine tuning .. to define more carefully 
staff's and Commissioners• roles and responsibilities. Unfortu-
nately, such 11 fine tuning .. will not solve the current deficiencies. 
The principal flaw in the current institutional structure 
is that both regulatory and administrative processes are performed 
by one agency. This structure gives the same individual the 
roles of both judge and advocate; the program developer and ad-
vocate is also responsible for adjudication. This structure 
creates internal conflicts which cannot be resolved and reduces 
the integrity of the regulatory process. The Warren-Alquist Act 
has improperly placed these two processes together. 
For example, the Chairman of the Commission appeared recently 
before the State Water Resources Control Board to recommend that 
the Department of Water Resources proceed with its coal-fired 
power plant proposal and stated that coal is an environmentally 
safe fuel. This action would be proper for a department director 
advocating a program or policy, but it is improper for a member 
of a quasi-judicial body to promote activity which will be before 
that body in a specific case. (The Department of Water Resources 
is expected to file an NOI for this plant.) 
Furthermore, to declare, by statute or otherwise, that there 
is a distinction between the staff and Commissioners will not 
alter the conflicting combination of regulatory and administrative 
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processes. These processes must ~e placed in separate agencies. 
Each agency should have control over tts awn staff and hudgetary 
decisions. To leave the Commissioners with the administrative 
controls over staff and budgetary resource a ll ocation will not 
alter old patterns. The Governor has demonstrated that he 
requires a vehicle for energy program innovat i on to reflect his 
policies. This requirement can be fulfilled only by a department, 
which will provide accountability and hopefully, more efficient 
action. For example, the Governor relies on line agencies, such 
as SolarCal, to implement innovative energy policies • . Moreover, 
the coordination of planning activities needs a central focus 
under the control of the Governor. Plural bodies cannot effec~ 
tively coordinate activities with any degree of coherence. 
Why a Department of Energy? 
The line-oriented responsibilities currently performed by 
the Commission should be given department status and placed 
within the Resources Agency. The Department would assume the 
administrative responsibilities of program development and 
operation, policy development, analysis, and advocacy. It would 
be led by an appointee of the Governor, serving at the Governor•s 
pleasure. 
The duties of the Department would be to develop the analyses 
necessary for the Biennial Report. T~is ~ould require the 
Department to analyze energy trends, develop electrical and 
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natural gas forecasts and examine the environmental and economic 
impacts of various energy development trends and alternatives. 
The Department would present this information, along with the 
adopted forecast and the approved resources plans in the form of 
the Biennial Report .. It would CBn~tttute the Governor's . stat~ment of 
energy policy. The Department WQUld be responsible for molt of the 
state's analytic activities devoted to energy and would perform 
the engineering analysis for power plant proposals. The 
Department would analyze and comment on the utilities' applications 
for new facilities before the Commission. 
In addition, the Department would be responsible for the 
energy-related developmental and promotional activities. in state 
government. Proposing conservation regulations to the Commission 
and operating promotional programs, such as education and out-
reach activities, would be the responsibility of the Department. 
The research and promotion of alternative energy sources is 
another duty the Department would assume. The Department should 
assume the responsibilities now performed by the SolarCal Office 
and the Office of Appropriate Technology (OAT). 1 
This study will show that the combination of regulatory and 
administrative processes in one agency is an ineffective insti-
tutional structure. Program operation and development require 
a more traditional line agency structure. Plural bodies generally 
are not used for these purposes. A 1965 study by the Little 
Hoover Commission on the use of boards and commissions in the 
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Resources Agency stated, "A general observation and recommendation 
(is), that plural bodies normally not be used to administer, , 
manage, direct, or operate a program. The case for a single, 
responsible executive in this capacity is well documented."2 
The Legislative Analyst and tne Auditor General have noted the 
difficulties experienced by the E~e~g~ Commission in providing 
clear priorities and effective management in the alternative 
research and development program.3 Program development and 
operation need direct, accountable action. Responsibility for 
their management should not be divided among several co-equal 
commission members. 
The Governor should have t~e responsibility, and the adminis-
trative machinery, for executing policy, coordinating energy 
activity, and implementing new programs. When the Governor initiates 
a n~w program he does not turn to t~e Commission. He has created 
both the SolarCal Council and the SolarCal Office to encourage 
and promote solar energy. The Office of Appropriate Technology 
was created to promote the design of structures and processes 
which utilize renewable resources. In 1977~ the federal government 
requested proposals for an Energy Extension Service, a large 
energy conservation effort. The Governor named the State Architect 
as the lead responsible agency. (For the state\smost recent effort 
in this area, OAT is the lead agency.) 
A department · ~tructure can increase efficiency and coordination. 
Budgets can receive more expeditious approval, contracts can be 
15 
executed more quickly, and staff receive clear direction in a 
line agency. Business can be conducted in an administrative 
fashion rather than jn a courtroom setting which can be costly 
and time consuming. Since a department is led by one person, 
it can formulate policy and interagency agreements withDut the 
necessary delay and debate encountered in a plural body. Clear 
leadership and the absence of the need to develop a consensus 
means that staff resources can be more appropriately used and 
priorities clearly established along programmatic lines. The 
department director can be directly accountable to the Governor 
and can draw on executive authority to provide coordination with 
other energy agencies. 
Adjudicatory bodies place primary emphasis upon regulatory 
activity. If one agency is given both regulatory and adminis-
trative roles, there is a shift of resources toward the regulatory 
activities. An examination of the Energy Commission's calendar 
during any month will illustrate the amount of time spent on 
regulatory activities. For example, the Commission's calendar 
indicates that from January 29 to March 28, 1979, the Commission 
will devote 75 percent of its activity to siting and regulatory 
cases. The Commission's budget propos.qls., in the pas.t tw...o yeqrs. ttaye 
reduced the promot.ional acttviti.es. · sub..stat~tially more thlln the. re.gu-
latory activities. Even within pro.grqms, budget · cuts: w..ere felt more 
in promotional activity. The conservation program'~ budget proposal~ 
h a v e be e n r e d u c e d 5 0 per c e n t i n t h e. p a s t t w:o yea r s.. M o s t of t he s e 
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cuts were made tn education and outreach programs ~htle the 
standards review and enforcement was reduced markedly less. A 
department structure can at least provide more attention and 
preserve more resources in these areas than a plural body. The 
immediate and controversial demands of a regulatory body will 
dominate the concern and attention of a plural body executing 
both regulatory and promotional functions . 
When the regulatory and administrative responst~tlities are 
separated, the need for debate and an open forum is still pro-
vided for those issues which require such activity. Under these 
recommendations, the Commission would provide the forum for the 
debate and weighing of issues and the Department would provide 
the speed of action, coordination, and promotion necessary for 
energy policy to be developed, defined, and implemented. The 
separation of these processes still provide for the four major 
energy functions to be located in one agency, but it aligns the 
regulatory and administrative responsibility in a more workable 
structure. 
A major question posed by the separation of these processes 
is the ability of the policy developing agency to have any real 
impact if the decision on policy in a specific case is made by 
another body. Can policy have any real impact when there is no 
regulatory process coupled with it to assure implementation? 
The recommendations made here can provide for policy to have 
an impact. There are two policy-sensitive instruments which the 
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Department will have a substantial role in developing and pro-
moting before the Commission: the electrical forecast and tha 
resource plan. The electrical forecast is sensitive to a number 
of policy considerations, such as future growtn trends, conser-
vation activities, and energy prices. The resource plan is 
based on the availability of alternative energy resources, costs, 
and environmental impacts. The Department exerts influence over 
both these instruments through tne development of forecasts and 
resource plans. In addition, the Department will operate many 
programs which influence both the adopted forecast and t~e resource 
plans. The Department•s activities in conservation, for example, 
would be registered in the forecast and its success in alternative 
energy development will affect the adopted resource plans. 
There are also a number of policy and program initiatives 
that can be taken by the Department which do not require regula-
tory approval. The Governor established the SolarC~]. Ceuncil 
and Office to pursue his solar energy policy and to establish 
a program with home builders. This did not require any regulatory 
approval. Many programs in the conservation, alternatives 
development, and energy analyses fields can be undertaken without 
the need for regulatory activity. Tne policy impact in these 
areas can be facilitated by a department structure. Programs can 
be initiated and implemented with more speed and political backing. 
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There are also areas in wh_ich q. ch..eck u·pon the. policy and pr9gram 
initiatives is needed. It is desirable for policy to have an 
impact and to direct the state•s r~sources, but issues such as 
environmental quality and rate structure need protection from 
ill-conceived or incomplete policies. Policy must not only be 
implemented but it must also be sensitive to established policies 
in other areas. The use of coal for power plants, for example, 
should be examined for its effect on air quality, cast~, and 
human health. There are questions which require the di.~palsi.anate 
and objective review of individuals whose task it is to weigh 
facts and to hear all interested parties. These decisions need 
to be insulated from day-to-day political forces. 
Re~ource Planning 
Resource planning refers to the process of preparing to 
meet future electrical needs with appropriate resources. This 
requires that fuel type, capacity, plant type, and perhaps general 
location of new facilities be defined early enough to plan, obtain 
permits, purchase materials, and construct new facilities. The 
state•s role in this area is now limited to determining available 
technologies, testing alternatives in the NOI, and reviewing 
alternative supply proposals as part of rate applications. 
The state•s role should be modified to require the Commission 
to approve resource plans. These approved plans would become part 
of the Biennial Report and provide the policy and planning guidance 
necessary to assist planning in the private sector. Agencies which 
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exercise authority influencing energy development (ARR, PUC, 
SWRCB, Coastal Commission} would be statutorily required to 
coordinate their planning and permit activities with the resource 
plan. This coordination allows agencies to focus on a specific 
product and should provide the early indication of feasi .~ility needed 
to plan effectively. A utility would know, for example, if a 
particular proposal was impossible because of limited air quality 
or water availability before an application was ever filed. 
Utilities would be required to submit resource plans every 
year. These plans would be made to correspond to the previously 
adopted forecast and would be presented to the Commission for 
approval. The plans could also contain a number of reserve 
facilities to meet contingencies, which may occur in the siting 
process. The Commission would provide the open forum for debate 
and review at the public hearings. Utilities, the Department of 
Energy, interested groups and the public could present alternative : 
proposals to the Commission to be included in the resource plan~. 
The Departm~nt wau·ld also be responsible for analyzing these plans. 
The Commission would weigh proposals, against the criteria of cost, 
feasibility, environmental impact, and other factors specified 
in statute. There would be a specified time for adoption of the 
plans. 
Once adopted, these resource plans would serve as the 
guidelines for the submission of applications for siting approval. 
A utility which submits an application for a facility contained 
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in the plans would move through a more expeditious siting 
process. M~ny of the generic issues involved in siting 
such facilities could be completed in the Department of Energy's 
analyses making an expeditious siting process feasible. A 
utility, however, would be free to pursue a proposal not contained 
in the plan, but an increased burden of proof would be placed upon 
the applicant and a more leng~hy siting process would be required. 
The Department of Energy's role in this process is to review 
and critique the resource plans and provide its analysis to the 
Commission. The Department would be required to conduct generic 
studies on various fuels and plant types to provide the state's 
early planning in this area. The Department could also propose 
its own resource plan to the Commission. 
Resource planning, much like demand forecasting, is an inter-
active process requiring substantial information from state 
agencies and the utilities. It has taken time to produce a sound 
electrical demand forecast which covers all sectors and more work 
still needs to be done. It should not be expected that the state 
will be capable of performing immediately all the tasks necessary 
for developing a workable resource plan. If the state assumes 
increased responsibility in this area, it would be understood that 
it will take time and some additional resources to perform this 
function well. 
The state is presently exercising some of the responsibilities 
required for resource planning. The various costs, environmental 
impacts, technical feasibility, and general location for electrical 
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facilities are currently reviewed and analyzed by the Commission. 
Some of these reviews occur in the determination of available 
technologies included in the Biennial Report. Other reviews 
occur during the NOI where alternative proposals are tested 
against utility applications. The difficulty with the present 
structure is its propensity to analyze these issues in the 
latter part of the regulatory process. The NOI is not the 
appropriate stage of the siting process to consider alternatives. 
Given the time and money expended by utilities and others on the 
proposal, and the lead time necessary for many facilities, 
alternatives would be difficult to implement at this stage. An 
earlier analysis of alternatives is necessary. 
Resource planning is one of the few ways to provide any real 
degree of certainty and coordination of state energy activities. 
Resource planning focuses the efforts of state agencies and 
compels them to provide an early indication of feasibility, cost, 
and environmental impact. This will not provide a guarantee, 
but it will give early warning and indication of the likelihood 
that a proposed facility can be constructed. 
Resource planning is also a more certain way for the state 
to influence utility activity in the area of alternatives 
development. Presently, the tools available for the state to 
encourage and develop alternative resources are research, 
regulation, and financial incentives through the tax system. 
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Utilities spend far more money on research than the state. The 
state has provided financial incentives for some alternative 
sources and has used regulation tnrough the siting process to 
encourage the use of certain fuels and plant types. The state 
has not used the planning process to influence alternative 
resources. Resource planning would allow the state to have an 
influence over utility planning and expenditures of funds for 
alternatives. It can give the state an increased ability to 
encourage alternative resources hy offering a positive incentive 
for alternatives development. 
This resource planning activity will not replicate the work 
of utilities nor is it a state-imposed plan developed by an 
unresponsive bureaucracy. This recommendation would require an 
interactive process between u~ilities, the state, and the public. 
Planning activities would be known early with time to consider 
alternativ~ proposals. A true dialogue could be opened between 
the three groups, which would still allow for utilities to 
exercise their own discretion and provide for ~tate policy 
influence over the use of public resources. 
Common Timetable 
One of the essential findings of this report is that the 
planning and regulatory process is confused, uncoordinated, and 
fragmented. Creating a department structure and providing for 
a resource plan will assist in reducing the confusion and provide 
for increased coordination. More is needed, however, to assure 
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that t~e various energy-related agencies coordinate both their 
regulatory and planning activities. To provide t~ts assurance, 
a common timetable should be placed into statute which requires 
these planning activities to he coordinated according to specific 
deadlines. The Commission's aut~ority to override the energy 
decisions of other state and local agencies in siting cases should · 
be affirmed by statute. 
Each of the major energy agencies lthe ARB, t~e PUC, the 
SWRCB, and the Coastal Commission} should be required by statute 
to comment and make findings of initial feasibility of t~e 
resource plans and any power plant siting cases. These agencies 
should be required to provide this analysis in the Biennial 
Report and the NOI on a time certain basis. Each agency will be 
required to provide, where appropriate, estimates of environmental 
impact and potential mitigation, likeli~ood of meeting any appli-
cable federal and state standards, costs of control measures, and 
the financial requirements needed for the proposed projects. 
The recent ARB-Energy Commission agreement is a good 
illustration of the manner in which the regulatory process should 
be coordinated. This agreement specifies the time at which the 
ARB will make initial determinations in the Energy Commission's 
regulatory process. The agreement also indicates the authority 
of each of the agencies (ARB, Commission, and local districts} 
and makes clear the extent to which local districts can go in 
enforcing state standards. The agreement, however, is only 
enforceable as long as the two agencies agree on its elements. 
To clarify its enforceability and ensure its legal standing, 
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this type of agreement should be placed in the law. In addition, 
the agreement only involves the ARB and Commission relationship 
in the regulatory process and does not address planning activities 
where the need for an early indication of feasibility is needed. 
The other major agencies, such as the PUC, SWQCB, and Coastal 
Commission, should be included in similar arrangements. The PUC, 
for example, should provide a preliminary indication of the 
financial feasibility of the projects contained in the resource 
plan and the impact on the rate base of the various alternatives. 
This can provide the department and Commission with early 
indication of the feasibility of various proposals and will enable 
the resource plan to be adopted with some reasonable level of 
certainty that the project can be financed. An increased level 
of analysis should be provided at the NOI stage, where the 
specific proposal in the resource plan takes on a site-specific 
nature. Thus, the level of comment from other agencies should 
be increased so that barring substantial errors or changes in 
federal or state requirements by law, the project should receive 
a preliminary "go" or "no go" determination. 
By focusing the attention of the various state agencies on 
a central document, requiring t~eir participation by statute, 
making a line agency the coordinating vehicle with responsibility 
to the Governor, and initiating the process early, the state can 
provide for the coordination and certainty necessary for sound 
planning of future energy needs. The requirement makes binding 
what now rests on agency discretion. 
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Surcharge 
The Commission is presently funded ny a surcharge of up to 
0.2 mills per kilowatt hour of electricity sold in the state. 
The surcharge was intended to have the users of electrical energy 
pay the cost of planning, regulation, and alternative activities. 
As an individual •s electrical use increases, his or her support 
for the state•s electrical energy activities increases. 
The surcharge has proved to be an excellent revenue source 
directly related to the state•s energy responsibilities and should 
be retained to fund both the Commission and the Department of 
Energy. The budgets of both agencies should be presented to the 
legislature. Any disputes or conflicts should be resolved by the 




1It should be noted, however, that neither of these offices 
was examined in detail during the course of this study. 
2commission on California State Government Organization and 
Economy, The Use of Boards and Commissions in the Resources 
Agency, April 1965, p. 8. 
3california, Joint Legis.lati.ve. Audi.t Commi.tte.e., lmproveroe.nts. 
Needed in Planning and Monitoring Re.searc~ and Development of 
Alternative Energy Resources, November 28, 1978, and California, 
Legislative Analyst, Supplemental Analysts, Item 173, Energy 
Resources Conservation and Development Commission, Research and 
Development Contracts, p. 1. 
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HISTORY OF THE WARREN-ALQUIST ACT 
In the early 1960's, the state's utility companies took the 
lead role in planning for new supplies of electricity. Although 
the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) had legal author-
ity to certify new power facilities, the PUC's decision process 
did not seriously challenge the utilities' choice of power plant 
designs or sites. Oil and natural gas, which were then the 
primary boiler fuels, were inexpensive and in plentiful supply. 
Nuclear power was in the early stages of commercialization, but 
it looked promising. In general, the early 1960's was an era of 
optimism concerning the state's energy future. 
During the late 1960's, growing public awareness of the 
diminishing quality and quantity of natural resources led federal, 
state and local governments to play a larger role in reviewing 
any project which was likely to have adverse environmental effects. 
Not suprisingly, the process of gaining approval for power plants 
became more difficult. By 1970, nearly 30 federal, state and 
local permits were necessary before a utility could construct a 
power plant.l Utilities began to express concern about delays in 
the power plant siting process and possible power shortages. 
In the early 1970's, the Legislature made several attempts 
to bring order into the power plant siting process; most of the 
energy-related legislation introduced between 1972 and 1974 dealt 
with power plant siting.2 In gen~ral, this legislation sought to 
create boards or commissions with exclusive authority to site new 
electrical facilities. 
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Three reports were published during this period which influ-
enced the Legislature•s approach to energy planning: 
1) 
2) Meeting California's Energy Requirements, 1975-2000, 
which the state•s five largest utilities commasstoned 
from the Stanford Research Institute in 1973. 
3) State Power Plant Siting: A Sketch of the Main Features 
of a Possible Aperoach, by California Institute of 
Technology 1 s Env1ronmen~al Quality Laboratory, which was 
also published in 1973. This report wa~ transmitted 
to the Assembly as Memorandum No. 4. These reports are 
summarized below. 
The Rand Report 
The Rand report consists of three volumes. Volume One deals 
with forecasting future demand for electricity; it suggests a 
methodology for developing such forecasts. Volume Two discusses 
power plant siting. Volume Three deals with slowing the growth 
rate in demand for electricity. 
The Rand report states that fragmented authority in what was 
then the state's regulatory framework for electrical facilities 
hindered the state's ability to deal ~ith delays in the siting -. 
process. According to the Rand report, many issues were "fall[ing] 
between the cracks''.6 The report states that "no one has adequate 
• 
responsibility for: 
Comprehensive statewide land use planning and standards to 
ensure that a proposed power plant would be compatible with 
its surroundings ; 




Identification of, and planning for, ~ower systems and sites 
alternative to those proposed by utillties. 
Overall allocation and conservation of natural resources, 
such as fuel and water. 
Means for conserving, and reducing demand for, electricity 
and other energy resources. 
Priorities to use in resolving conflicting needs and values. 
Research and development of new technologies and better 
methods of selecting sites for power plants . 
An organized method of presenting Californta•s needs and 
priorities to federal agencies and of attempting to influence 
federal research and development policies and actions to 
meet California•s needs."7 
The report suggests that the state should establish an insti-
tutional framework for planning future energy facilities and 
assuring that needed facilities are constructed in time to meet 
increasing demand. The main elements of this framework are: 
1} An ••open planning" process involving the public and the 
state early in utilities• plans to construct new 
facilities. 
2} A power plant siting agency which consolidates previously 
fragmented authority over land use, environmental 
quality, and energy policy. 
3) An independent forecasting capability in either the 
siting agency or a line agency. 
4} Policies for reducing energy demand.a 
Within this framework, a utility would inform state author-
ities early its planning process of the kinds of facilities (i.e., 
fuel type, size) it intended to build and the general location of 
the facilities. The public would have access to this information 
and would have an opportunity to participate in the planning 
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process. The siting agency would develop a forecast of future 
demand for electricity and would determine the legitimate need 
for new facilities according to the forecast. The siting author-
ity would then review sites where the utility could construct 
needed facilities. The state's role in reducing energy demand 
would be to promote conservation measures, such as home insulation, 
more efficient home appliances, and educational programs. The 
report argues that such conservation measures would reduce the 
need for additional electrical facilities and, consequently, 
would reduce the adverse environmental effects associated wtth 
energy facilities. The Rand report states, however, that "even 
if such {conservation] policies {are] successful .•. it is estimated 
that the growth in demand for electricity {even at a growth rate 
of 3% per year] will still be significant and many new power 
facilities will be required in the next 30 years." 9 
The Rand report is significant not only because it influenced 
the Legislature's actions, but also because it recommended that 
the state become involved in areas where state government previ-
ously maintained no authority. For example, the state had no 
role in conserving energy, in planning for future energy facili-
ties, and in providing public access to utilities• plans early 
in the planning process. The state•s regulatory authority over 
energy matters was confined at that time primarily to health and 
safety issues. 
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The Stanford Research Institute Report 
After the Rand report was published, the state's five largest 
utilitieslO contracted with Stanford Research Institute (SRI) to 
study California's future energy needs and the problems which the 
state faced until the year 2000. The SRI report, issued in 
May 1973, differs from the Rand report. SRI concludes that a 
nationwide energy shortage will . occur in the future, but the 
shortage will be less severe in California. The report argues 
that energy prices will continue to rise, but that electricity 
prices are non-elastic; that is, demand for electricity will not 
decline substantially as prices rise. The report discounts the 
contribution that alternative energy resources, such as solar and 
geothermal energy, can make to the state•s energy supply in this 
century, and states that the state will continue to rely on oil, 
gas, hydro-electrtcity, and nuclear power for its f~ture electric 
production. Finally, the report argues against the sta~e•s 
requiring energy conservation because it would have a negative 
effect on the state•s economy. 
It is obvious that the two reports, Rand and SRI, differ in 
their approach to solving California energy problems. Basically, 
Rand argues for a systematic state involvement in energy planning 
and regulation, while SRI argues for state involvement to extend 
only in the power plant licensing process and in simplifying the 
regulatory maze that federal, state, and local government regula-
tions created. Both reports indicate that division of state 
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authority and requirements for numerous permits before new power 
facilities can be constructed cause delay and indecision in the 
regulatory process. 
Environmental Quality Lab 
Early in 1973, the Assembly Subcommittee on Electrical Energy 
Policy held several days of hearings on electrical power and how 
it should be planned and regulated. The Environmental Quality 
Laboratory (EQL) Memorandum No. 4 was presented at these hearings. 
This document outlines the features of a siting process; it sub-
stantially influenced the drafting of the Warren-Alquist Act. 
The major features of this memorandum are summarized below. 
Siting Council -The memorandum calls for a siting council, 
composed exclusively of public members, "which should have 
the sole authority and responsibility to select and certify, 
from among alternatives, the sites and conditions for 
nuclear and fossil-fueled power plants". The council is 
to be the "one-stop" siting agency for the state. 11 
Alternative Sites - EQL argues for a planning process that 
gives early attention to "alternative sites, designs, fuels, 
transmission corridors, etc."12 The recommendation is for 
the siting process to provide five alternative sites, which 
would later be narrowed to three. This procedure would 
create an inventory of acceptable sites for later use. 
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One-Stop Authority and Preemption - "A rational siting 
program must, we believe, abandon the pattern of fragmented 
authority that characterizes the present siting process. 
Fragmented authority has produced unnecessary delay, con-
fusion, parochialism, inconsistency, and buck-passing. We 
believe that in the interest of efficient and thorough 
planning, the siting council should (a} operate on a one-
stop basis and (b) should preempt local jurisdiction over 
the environmental issues related to siting.nl3 
Open Planning- EQL called on utilities to identify their 
supply proposals early in the planning stages, and urged 
early public access and full participation in the decision-
making process. This process was seen as a "cooperative 
venture rather than an adversary contest in which each side 
tries in a public hearing to convince a third party of the 
correctness of its viewsn.l4 The open planning concept has 
received considerable attention since the EQL memorandum; 
the Energy Commission•s Notice of Intention (NOI) procedures 
is an attempt to initiate open planning. EQL defined open 
planning in the following manner: 
Open planning would begin at the outset of the 
decision process--at the time, that is, when a 
utility initiates its own inquiries about the 
need for new capacity, its location, design, and 
operation. Utilities would be required to 
announce the beginning of their inquiries and 
to invite meetings with any concerned groups and 
individuals, both public and private. They would 
also be required to actively seek out such groups 
and individuals and to solicit their views.I5 
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EQL's memorandum sets the stage for both the informal NOI 
process and the concept of a Public Advisor, whose duty it is 
to seek out and to assist the public before the Commission. 
The Commission's current siti~g process differs, however, from 
the process EQL describes. The most critical difference concerns 
the question: When does the open planning process start? 
Following the publication of the Rand report and additional 
hearings in the Assembly, most energy legislation sought to 
increase the state's role in energy p1~nni~g by placing in one 
state institution the authority for forecasting, conservation, 
and research, as well as siting. This combination of regulatory 
and promotional functions was contained in SB 283 (Alquist), 
introduced in the 1973 Session. The bill was passed by both 
Houses but was vetoed by Governor Reagan. In May 1974, following 
the Arab oil embargo, an almost identical bill, the Warren-Alquist 
Act (AB 1575 - Warren), was passed by the Legislature and was 
signed into law by Governor Reagan. 
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STATE ENERGY FUNCTIONS 
THE ENERGY COMMISSION 
The Warren-Alquist Act gave the Commission responsibility 
for four energy functions: forecasting and planning for future 
energy demand; energy conservation; power plant siting; and 
research and development of energy sources of unique benefit to 
the state. Each of these functions is examined below. 
Planning and Forecasttng · 
The Commission carried out its planning function by preparing 
every two years a report to the Governor and the Legislature 
which expresses the state's energy policy. Public Resources Code 
Section 25309 states the general nature of the Biennial Report: 
" ..• a comprehensive report designed to identify 
emerging trends related to energy supply, demand, 
and conservation and public health and safety factors, 
to specify the level of statewide and service area 
electrical energy demand for each year in the coming 
5-, 12-, and 20-year periods, and to provide the 
basis for state policy and actions in relations, 
thereto, including, but not limited to, approval 
of new sites for additional facilities." 
The purposes which the Biennial Report serves are: 
To determine and establish the goals that must be met 
in order to satisfy the electrical energy needs of the 
state. 
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To identify and evaluate the variety of opportunities 
available in the state for satisfying its electrical 
energy needs. 
To identify and evaluate the relative costs and benefits, 
impacts, and risks of alternative ways of meeting the 
state•s electrical energy needs. 
To set forth the policies which will guide the 
Commission in accomplishing the goals that are 
established. 
To set forth the knowledge findings, criteria and 
tests which will be used by the Commission in making 
decisions on specific electrical energy proposals. 1 
Thus, the Biennial Report is the state•s central planning document 
for energy demand and supply. 
One of the main features of the Biennial Report is the fore-
cast of demand for electricity. The Warren-Alquist Act requires 
the state•s electrical utilities to submit to the Commission 
every two years reports specifying 5-, 12-, and 20-year forecasts 
of demands and resources in their respective service areas. The 
Commission must establish a common forecasting methodology for 
utilities to use in preparing these reports. Utilities are allowed, 
however, to include in the reports additional forecasts based on 
their own methodologies. The Commission must evaluate the 
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utilities• forecasts, taking into consideration the Public 
Utilities Commission's comments; the Department of Finance's 
population growth estimates; statewide and regional land use, 
transportation, and economic development programs; critical 
environmental issues; public health and safety; and the effect 
on electricity rates of new facilities.2 The Commission also 
must identify reasonable alternatives to the electricity-
generating technologies which utilities propose. 
The Commission must publish preliminary and final reports 
containing its findings and conclusions on the utilities• forecasts. 
These reports precede the Biennial Report. The Commission must 
hold hearings prior to issuing the final report. The reports are 
based on the Commission's independent analysis and public comments 
on the utilities• forecasts. The contents of the reports, which 
are generally reiterated in the Biennial Report, include: 
1) The Commission's evaluation of the environmental, 
economic, health, and safety issues associated with 
constructing and operating the facilities which the 
utilities propose. 
2) Alternative technologies which the Commission identifies 
as reasonable. 
3) The Commission's determination of anticipated demand for 
energy on a 5-, and 12-year basis. This determination 
of demand, which includes all reasonable conservation 
efforts, is used as a basis for certifying new facilities. 
The Commission's determination of 20-year demand is used 
as a basis for recommending energy conservation activities. 
4) A statement of what new facilities are needed statewide 
and in each service area. 
5) An analysis of m3thods to reduce the growth in demand 
for electricity. 
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When the Commission began its operation in 1975, it did not 
have sufficient staff or data to generate an independent forecast. 
The Commission adopted as its first forecast the same forecast 
which the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) developed pursuant to 
its General Order 131. The current forecast, which the Commission 
adopted in 1977, anticipates a growth rate of 3.8% per year over 
the next 10 years. This growth rate calls for an additional 
23,700 MW of electrical capacity by 1990. The Commission's next 
forecast, which is due in the spring of 1979, is expected to show 
a lower growth rate for the next 12 years. 
Chapter 1013, Statutes of 1978 (SB 1859, Alquist), made two 
important changes in the Commission's planning and forecasting 
mandates. First, the Commission's demand forecast is now the 
primary forum for determining all conservation, load management, 
and other demand-reducing measures which can reasonably be expected 
to occur. Second, the Commission must hold ••generic" proceedings 
(Section 25309) to determine the commercial availability of 
alternative generating and nongenerating technologies (e.g., load 
management, fuel cells). The first change specifies, in effect, 
that conservation issues are to be considered only in the 
Commission's forecast and not in individual siting cases. The 
second change allows the Commission, with respect to generating 
technologies, to "define the threshold evidentiary burden for any 
person proposing a technology in a siting case".4 That is, the 
generic proceedings allow the Commission to determine how much 
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and what kinds of information are necessary in order to offer a 
particular alternative as a challenge to whatever technology a 
utility proposes in a siting case. For example, if the generic 
proceedings were to indicate tnat fuel cells are commercially 
available, it would then be possible to perform a comparative 
environmental, financial, and technical analysis of fuel cells 
versus the utility's proposal in a siting case. Both of tbese 
changes are intended to expedite the siting process. 
One issue which the Commission's planning mandates leave 
unresolved is the extent to which the Commission should be 
involved in resource planning. Resource planning can be defined as 
determining the location, fuel type, capacity, and chronology of 
new generating facilities. Although Chapter 1013, Statutes of 
1978, prohibits the Commission from mandating a specific supply 
plan for any utility, the same legislation requires the Commission 
to include in the Biennial Report some elements of a supply plan: 
a statement of probable capacity additions on a service area 
basis; the availability of power from cogeneration and purchased 
power; a determination of the commercial availability of 
generating technologies; and an indication of those technologies 
which merit additional research and development. 
Conservation 
The Warren-Alquist Act requires the Commission to conduct a 
general assessment of energy conservation opportunities in the 
state. The general assessment includes continuous studies on: 
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1} Pricing of energy. 
2} Improving building design and insulation. 
3} Restricting promotional activities to increase 
electricity use. 
4} Improving the efficiency of home appliances. 
5} Improving power generating and transmitting facilities. 
6} Compgring efficiencies in alternative methods of energy 
use. 
The Commission is required to include its recommendations on 
conservation in the Biennial Report. 
The Commission is also required to implement conservation 
measures through regulations. Specifically, the Commission is 
required to: 
1} Adopt 11 prescriptive 11 building standards for lighting, 
insulation, and climate control. These standards 
require buildings to have, for example, insulation of 
a particular rating (e.g., R-19}, or a heating and air 
conditioning system with a specific rating in Btu•s/hour. 
2} Adopt 11 performance 11 standards for residential and non-
residential buildings. These standards specify allowable 
energy consumption per square foot of floor space. 
3} Adopt efficiency standards for those appliances which 
consume a 11 significant amount of energy on a statewide 
basis 11 (Section 25402c}. The Commission has adopted 
standards for air conditioners, refrigerators, freezers, 
water heaters, space heaters, and plumbing fixtures. 
4} Adopt standards to guide utilities• load management 
efforts. 
5} Recommend standards for power plant efficiency. 6 
The standards relating to building design and construction must 
be no more costly th,an 11 historical 11 construction tech.ntq.ue.s, would be 
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when compared over the economic life of the building. The 
appliance efficiency standards must be technically feasible and 
must not increase consumers' costs over the life of the appliance. 
The load management standards must be technically feasible and 
no more costly than new electrical capacity. 
The building and appliance industries have initiated legal 
challenges to the Commission's standards,? and have charged 
that the Commission's authority to issue such standards is open-
ended; that is, the Commission has substantial discretion over 
what devices will be subject to standards. 
The Commission's conservation efforts affect the Commission's 
planning, forecasting, and siting activities. The previous 
section discusses the recent changes to the Warren-Alquist Act 
which specify that the forecast is assumed to include all reasonable 
conservation measures. These changes also specify that the need 
for new power plants is determined on the basis of the 5- and 
12-year forecasts. The success of the Commission's conservation 
efforts may, therefore, influence the need for new facilities. 
The Public Utilities Commission (PUC), the Department of 
Housing and Community Development (HCD), and local governments 
all have a role in implementing conservation measures. The PUC's 
activities overlap the Commission's in certain areas and, 
therefore, are discussed in the section on the Commission's 
relationship with other agencies. Prior to the Warren-Alquist 
Act, HCD had responsibility for building efficiency standards. 
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HCD continues its involvement in this area through contracts with 
the Commission. Local governments enforce the Commission's 
standards and may also develop their own conservation mandates. 
Power Plant Siting 
The Commission's power plant siting process is contained in 
Public Resources Code Sections 25500 through 25542. The 
Commission's authority to certify electricity-generating facil-
ities applies to thermal power plants with a capacity of at 
least 50 MW and to the appurtenant facilities. 
The siting process is divided into two stages: (1) the 
Notice of Intention (NOI), which lasts 12 months, and (2} the 
Application for Certification (AFC), which generally lasts 18 
months. For geothermal facilities and some alternative techno-
logies, the entire process lasts from 9 to 12 months. The two 
stages are described below. These cases are adjudicated by 
a committee of the Commission comprised of a presiding member 
and one additional Commissioner. 
The Notice of Intention 
A utility proposing to build a power plant or an electric 
transmission line must submit a NOI to the Commission. The pur-
pose of the NOI is to allow the Commission to make a preliminary 
determination of whether the proposed site for the facility is 
suitable and whether the proposed facility is needed according to 
the Commission's adopted demand forecasts. 
The NOI must contain at least three alternative sites. At 
least one site must be located outside the coastal zone. The NOI 
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must also contain a description of the proposed sites; a summary 
of the design criteria of the facilities; the types of fuel to be 
used; a preliminary statement of the relative economic, techno-
logical, and environmental advantages of the facilities at each 
site; and a statement of the need for the facility based on the 
Commission•s most recent Biennial Report. 8 
If the Commission staff determines that the NOI is incomplete 
as filed, the NOI is returned to the applicant with a statement 
of its deficiencies. 
When the Commission accepts a NOI, the 11 clock starts 11 on the 
12-month time requirement for a NOI decision. The Commission 
published a summary of the NOI in a newspaper in each county where 
the proposed sites are located. The Public Utilities Commission 
and other state, local, and federal agencies having an interest 
in the proposed facilities also receive a · copy of the NOI. 
Chapter 1013, Statutes of 1978 (SB 1859, Alquist) divided 
the NOI hearings into two phases. During the first phase, which 
lasts six months, the Commission holds: (1) public informational 
presentations in the counties in which the proposed facilities 
are located; and (2) nonadjudicatory hearings. 
The informational presentations provide 11 knowledge and an 
understanding of the proposed facilities and sites ... 9 The non-
adjudicatory hearings provide the public and government agencies 
an opportunity to participate in an informal setting without 
concern about strict legal requirements and cross-examination. 
They also provide for general comments from concerned 
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parties about the environmental, public health, safety, economic, 
social, and land use effects of the proposed facilities, as well 
as information about alternative sources of electrical generating 
capacity. 
Following the nonadjudicatory hearings, the Commission must 





Identifies issues for consideration in the second phase 
of the NOI (i.e., adjudicatory hearings). 
Identifies issues which may be eliminated from further 
consideration during the NOI. 
Identifies issues which should be deferred until the 
AFC stage. 
Makes proposed findings on matters relevant to the 
Commission•s final report on the NOI.10 
The second six-month phase of the NOI begins with adjudicatory 
hearings. These hearings provide a record upon which the 
Commission can base its NOI decisions. Following the adjudicatory 
hearings, the Commission must issue its final report on the NOI. 





The Commission•s findings and conclusions regarding the 
conformity of the proposed sites with the 12-year fore-
cast in the Biennial Report and with applicable local, 
state, and federal laws, including state and regional 
long-range land use plans. 
Findings of the Coastal Commission and BCDC. 
The Commission•s findings on the acceptability and 
relative merit of each proposed site. 
The Commission•s findings and conclusions on the safety 
and reliability of the facilities at each site.ll 
The Commission must hold hearings on the final report. 
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The Commission may not approve the NOI unless the final 
report shows that two proposed sites are acceptable, unless t~e 
applicant has made a good faith effort to find alternative sites 
and only one site is acceptable. The Commission's written 
decision on the NOI is due no later than 12 months after the NOI 
is accepted. 
NOI's are not required for some power plants. These 
include: 
1) Geothermal power plants which can provide "commercial 
quantities" of geothermal resources. 
2) Thermal cogeneration facilities up to 300 MW. 
3) Thermal power plants feasible only at the energy source. 
4) Modifications of existing facilities. 
5) New thermal power plant technologies up to 300 MW. 
6) Any thermal power plant up to 100 MW. 12 
Application for Certification 
Although the Commission has received and processed several 
NOI's, only one proposed power plant has proceeded to the AFC 
stage. 13 The AFC process, therefore, is not as well defined as 
the NOI process. 
In general, the technical details of a proposed power plant 
and related facilities are considered during the AFC stage. The 
AFC must contain a detailed description of the design, construc-
tion, and operation of the proposed facility, including safety 
and reliability information; site maps containing geologic, 
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environmental, and demographic data; a statement of need for the 
facility, generating capacity, plant life and fuel costs; and a 
description of cost and routes of transmission lines associated 
with the facility.l4 
When the Commission receives an AFC, it must initiate the 
process of complying with the California Environmental Quality 
Act (CEQA). The Commission acts as the lead agency responsible 
for the preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR) under 
CEQA. The EIR must be completed within one year after the AFC is 
received. 
Within 90 to 240 days (i.e., three to eight months) after 
the AFC is filed, the Commission must begin public hearings in 
either Sacramento, San Francisco, Los Angeles, or San Diego, which-
ever is nearest to the proposed site. Additional hearings may 
be held in the county in which the proposed facility is located. 
Within 18 months after the AFC is filed, the Commission must issue 
a written decision on the AFC. 
In the written AFC decision, the Commission must include: 
1) Provisions stating how the design, siting and operation 
of the proposed facility protect the environment and 
assure public health and safety. 
2) Provisions, where applicable, to meet the requirements 
which the Coastal Commission and BCDC may specify. 
3) The facilities• conformance with all applicable construc-
tion standards and applicable state, federal and local 
laws. 
4) Provisions for restoring the site for environmental pur-
poses if the AFC is denied. 
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5) Conformity of the facilities with the 12-year forecast 
in the Biennial Report.l5 
The Commission is prohibited from certifying any facilities 
which: 
1) Add generating capacity to a multifacility site in ex-
cess of the maximum allowable capacity as specified 
2) 
in the NOI. 
Conflict with state or local laws or standards {e.g., 
state air quality standards) unless certification is 
required for the public convenience and necessity. 
3) The Coastal Commission or BCDC designate as un~uttahle 
pursuant to their respective mandates. 
4) Are in specified environmentally sensitive areas. 
5) Nuclear power plants, under specified conditions. 
The Commission's decision on any AFC is subject to judicial review. 
For geothermal power plants, the time requirement for an AFC 
decision is 12 months. As stated previously, NOI's are not 
necessary for all geothermal facilities. If a NOI is filed and 
approved, however, the AFC decision time is shortened to nine 
months. Three alternative sites are not required in either a 
NOI or an AFC for geothermal facilities. 
The Commission may also approve county programs for certifying 
geothermal facilities. Once approved, county programs supersede 
all of the Commission's procedures for certifying geothermal 
facilities. The Commission may revoke its approval of a county's 
program under specified conditions, however. 
In both the NOI and AFC stages, the Commission has the aut~ority 
to review,with comments from the PUC, the relative economic, 
financial, and rate impacts of a proposed facility! 
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Research and Development 
The Commission's mandates for research and development are · 
intended to develop alternative energy resources and to reduce 
the state's dependence on any one particular energy resource. 
The Commission's basic mandate is to develop and coordinate a 
research and development program in "energy supply, consumption, 
conservation, and the technology of siting. 16 The Commission 
is required to carry out technical assessment studies on "all 
forms of energy and energy-related problems, in order to influ-
ence federal research and development priorities and to be in-
formed on future energy options and their impacts." 17 The Com-
mission is specifically required to do technical assessments of 
alternative energy sources, such as solar and geothermal, ad-
vanced nuclear power concepts, coastal and offshore siting, the 
use of waste water for power plant cooling, modes of transporta-
tion, recycling of materials, the use of waste heat, and the use 
of agricultural products and municipal waste as energy sources. 
The Commission must submit each year for the Governor's budget 
an ''integrated program of proposed research and development". 18 
The Commission's research and development efforts have con-
centrated on renewable energy resources. For example, the Com-
mission has developed standards and testing criteria for solar 
energy systems. Solar systems must meet these criteria in order 
to qualify for the state's 55% solar energy tax credit. The 
Commission will also publish a design manual for builders wishing 
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to use solar devices in new construction. Recent legislation 
(Chapter 1367, Statutes of 1978) requires the Commission to con-
duct a statewide design competition to select outstanding examples 
of residential buildings using passive solar architecture. 
Recent legislation also expanded the Commission's role in 
promoting wind energy and simplified the Commission's siting 
process for geothermal, cogeneration, and experimental thermal 
power plant designs.l9 
Amendments to the Warren-Alguist Act 
The Legislature has amended the Warren-Alquist Act since 
1975 to correct problems which arose during the application of 
the Act's mandates (e.g., power plant siting delays) and to clari-
fy the state's policy regarding energy supply and conservation 
options. The most important modifications are discussed below. 
The Legislature passed three laws in 1975 (Public Resources 
Code, Sections 25524.1, 25524.2 and 25524.3) which discourage, 
for the time being, the development of nuclear power in California. 
These laws specifically prohibit the Commission from certifying 
nuclear power plants unless the federal governme~t has identi-
fied, and there exists, technologies for (1) (Section 25524.1) 
reprocessing nuclear fuel rods (this law applies to nuclear 
plants which are designed to use reprocessed fuel), and (2) 
(Section 25524.2) disposing of high-level nuclear waste. Sec-
tion 25524.3 requires the Commission to study the feasibility of 
placing nuclear power plants underground for safety reasons and 
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prohibits the Commission from certifying nuclear plants until 
the study is completed. The Commission completed the study in 
July 1978. The Commission concluded that design features which 
are cheaper than undergrounding are equally effective for insur-
ing safety.20 
Chapter 1013, Statutes of 1978 (SB 1859-Alquist), contains 
the most significant changes which have been made to the 
Warren-Alquist Act. This legislation implements regulatory 
reforms which both the Commission and the utility companies 
found necessary. Specifically, Chapter 1013: 
1) Shortened the Notice of Intention stage of power 
plant siting from 18 to 12 months and divided the 
NOI into two phases: informational presentations and 
nonadjudicatory hearings; and adjudicatory hearings. 
2) Eliminated the requirement that the Commission must 
determine the "accuracy and acceptability'' of utility 
forecasts. The Commission still assesses the utility 
forecasts and adopts its own forecast. 
3) Changed the content of the Biennial Report to make the 
Report the state's central working document for energy 
supply and demand issues. The forecast, which is in the 
Biennial Report, is now assumed to include all reasonable 
conservation measures available. The Report also con-
tains the Commission's assessment of alternative techno-
logies. This assessment helps the Commission to focus 
in the NOI on those alternatives which are commercially 
available. 
Chapter 1010, Statutes of 1978 (SB 1805-Joint Committee on 
the State's Economy) allows utilities to bypass the NOI process 
for the following technologies: cogeneration facilities up to 
300 MW; modifications to existing facilities; thermal power 
plants feasible only at the energy source; thermal power plants 
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less than 100 MW; new thermal power plant technologies up to 
300 MW. 
Chapter 1271, Statutes of 1978 (AB 2644-Goggin) changes the 
siting process for geothermal facilities. Primarily, this 
chapter shortens the Application for Certification process from 
18 to 12 months for geothermal facilities, and makes the NOI 
optional in certain cases. This chapter also allows the 
Commission to certify county geothermal development programs which 
supplement the Commission•s siting procedures for geothermal 
facilities. 
RELATIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES 
Although the Warren-Alquist Act intended to make the Commission 
the single regulatory agency for energy issues, other state 
agencies maintain energy-related regulatory functions. In 
general, these agencies are ••single purpose" agencies (e.g., the 
Air Resources Board) whose authority to issue permits affects 
the power plant siting process. This section on the Commission•s 
relations with other agencies discusses the general powers of 
these agencies and areas where their authority conflicts with 
the Commission•s authority. 
Energy-Related Functions of the Air Resources Board 
General Authority 
Air quality regulation in California is divided between the 
Air Resources Board (ARB) and local Air Pollution Control 
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Districts (APCD). The ARB has authority to divide the state 
into air basins (Health and Safety Code Section 39606a) and to 
adopt ambient air quality standards for each basin (Section 
39606b). The ARB is also the air pollution control agency for 
all purposes set forth in federal law (Section 39602). The 
APCD's must achieve and maintain state and federal air quality 
standards (Section 40001). In general, the ARB may assume the 
authority of an APCD if the APCD is not performing its duties 
adequately (Section 41505). The ARB also provides assistance 
to APCD's which do not have sufficient staff and financial 
resources. 
Specific Procedures 
The ARB exercises influence over the power plant siting 
process through its authority to prepare the State Implementation 
Plan (SIP) for meeting federal ambient air quality standards 
(Section 39602). The SIP contains New Source Review (NSR) rules 
which APCD's use in deciding whether to issue permits for new 
air pollution sources. The federal Clean Air Act of 1970 
required states to prepare SIP's. California currently has a 
SIP, a part of which was prepared by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) which must approve SIP's. In 1977, 
amendments to the Clean Air Act required states to revise their 
SIP's. The ARB must submit the revised SIP to the EPA in 
January 1979. Federal law requires that Califo~nia, through 
its SIP, meet all federal ambient air quality standards by 1982, 
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with a possible extension until 1987 for oxidant and carbon 
monoxide pollutants. 
The APCD's influence over power plant siting is exercised 
through the issuance of "Authority to Construct" permits. 
According to the ARB, it is currently illegal to construct a 
thermal power plant in California without obtaining a permit 
from the local APCo. 21 NSR rules, which the APCD's use in permit 
decisions, may vary between APCD's, but all NSR rules are subject 
to ARB approval. The NSR rules specify that: (1} new 
stationary pollution sources must use the Best Available Control 
Technology (BACT), and (2) new sources may not contribute to 
violations of either federal or state22 ambient air quality 
standards or to violations of the federal Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD} increments in certain sensitive areas. 
(These areas are designated Class I, II, or III; Class I areas 
are the most sensitive, e.g., national parks.) 
In cases where a new source would violate state or federal 
ambient air quality standards, the NSR rules allow the APCD's 
to approve the source if the apptacant of.fers emissions 
trade-offs; that is, the source proponent must take responsibility 
for decreasing air pollutants from existing sources in the area 
so that air quality, incl.uding emissions from the new source, 
improves. In some cases, interdistrict trade-offs are allowed. 
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Conflicts Between the ARB/APCD's and the 
Conservation and Deve o ment Comm1ssion 
Jurisdictional Issues 
The ARB/APCD authority to issue permits for power plants has 
not meshed well in the past with the Commission's power plant 
siting process. No mechanism existed for coordinating the time 
requirements of the ARB/APCD permit process with the Commission's 
36-month certification process.23 The ARB and the Commission, 
however, have drafted an agreement specifying each agency's role 
in the siting process (see Section 4, p. 60). The following 
discussion provides background on the jurisdictional conflicts 
which led to the agreement. 
The Warren-Alquist Act gives the Commission the "exclusive 
authority to certify all [power plant] sites and related 
facilities in the state". Section 25500 also states that a 
Commission power plant certificate is ''in lieu of any permit ... " 
required by any other state agency "to the extent permitted 
under federal law". The Commission committee reviewing Pacific 
Gas and Electric's (PG&E) proposed coal-fired power plant has 
argued 24 that Public Resources Code Section 25500 gives the 
Commission, instead of the ARB, the authority to issue air 
quality permits for power plants. The ARB disagrees.2 5 The ARB 
argues that because it has authority to prepare the federally-
required SIP, and the federal Clean Air Act requires that the 
SIP contain a permit process for new stationary pollution sources, 
the APCD's, in conjunction with the ARB, are, therefore, issuing 
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permits under the aegis of federal law. Thus, the Commission•s 
authority to issue 11 in lieu of 11 permits does not apply because 
that authority exists only to the extent allowed by federal law. 
The question is: Which agency should have authority to issue 
air quality permits for power plants? A recent opinion of the 
California Legislative Council sheds light on this question. 
The opinion makes the following points: 
Under current state and federal law, the Energy 
Resources Conservation and Development Commission could 
be the permitting authority for thermal power plants, 
under the federal Clean Air Act, only if the State 
Implementation Plan under such act is revised to specify 
the Commission as the agency to function in this capacity, 
subject to the approval of the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
The Administrator•s regulations under the Clean Air 
Act permit a state to divide its permitting functions among 
agencies with expertise in the respective areas involved, 
such as thermal power plants and air pollution generally. 
However, the Administrator does have broad approval and 
review powers over State Implementation Plans (see 42 
U.S.C. 7410, 7424, and 7502 to 7504, incl.). 
Consequently, in our opinion, the Legislature, by 
statute, could designate the Commission as, or require that 
the Commission be, the permitting authority for thermal 
power plants under the Clean Air Act; but such a designation, 
as part of the plan, would be subject to review and approval 
of the Administrator. 
There is no prohibition in the Clean Air Act against 
a state dividing responsibility for preparation of the 
State Implementation Plan among various agencies with 
expertise in respective areas. However, as a practical 
matter, there would have to be some ultimate authority to 
decide any conflicts between the agencies involved, and an 
agency representing 11 a state, .. in our opinion, would 
necessarily have to present the plan as an integrated whole 
to the Administrator, with all conflicts in its provisions 
resolved (e.g., see 42 U.S.C. 7410) ,26 
57 
Whether the EPA would be willing to designate the Commission, 
or another agency, as the air quality permitting authority for 
power plants under the SIP is not known. The EPA may be unwilling 
to allow the state to bifurcate air quality permitting authority 
in the SIP. Furthermore, the Clean Air Act requires an 
"environmental" agency at the state level to prepare the SIP; the 
Commission is not an 11 environmental 11 agency. 
The existence of state ambient air quality standards has been 
another source of conflict in air quality regulation. Federal 
law requires only that the SIP contain methods for meeting federal 
air quality standards; there is no requirement that the SIP contain 
methods for meeting the more stringent state standards. The ARB, 
however, intended originally to include in the SIP measures for 
meeting state standards. The rationale behind this move was 
that utilities and APco•s would have to deal only with one set 
of standards. Moreover, the methods for meeting standards would 
become 11 federalized 11 and, therefore, subject to stronger enforce-
ment than the state could provide. The ARB has no doubts,depending 
on the site, about the ability of new power plants to meet the 
state standards. 
The ARB decided recently, however, that the SIP will not 
contain methods for meeting state standards because utilities 
and manufacturers expressed concern that federalizing the state 
standards would mean that, even in an emergency situation, the 
state could not override its own air quality standards. Whether 
this concern is real or perceived is unclear, however. Regardless 
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of what is in the SIP, the EPA may hesitate to enforce any air 
quality standards which exceed federal requirements. 
Emissions Control 
The Commission siting procedure has been complicated by a 
lack of coordination with the ARB on mitigation measures for 
emissions from power plants. For example, APCD's can define 
Best Available Control Technology (BACT) for power plants within 
their jurisdiction. The result is that BACT definitions are made 
on a case-by-case basis and, therefore, have been called a "moving 
target". The Commission has been unable to specify in its siting 
process what BACT is for a particular electricity-generating 
technology. 
Trade-off requirements have also been a moving target. The 
ARB's policy has been that emission reductions may not be 
counted as trade-offs if the reductions are necessary to comply 
with proposed federal, state, or district rules and regulations. 
Thus, every time a district proposes a new regulation, the 
a v a il a b 1 e trade- o f f s dec rea s e . and . t h. e. b a .s e. 1 i: n e a g a i n st. w h. i. c tt 
trade-offs are measured may change. There has been no way to 
fix the available trade-offs within the Commission's siting 
procedure, but recent NSR rules allow the purchase of trade-offs 
when a NOI is filed. Although the ARB does not have responsibility 
for energy conservation programs, its regulations affect energy 
efficiency in automobiles, industrial processes, and electric 
power generation. The ARB could also require conservation 
measures as a method of improving air quality. 
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The ARB prepares forecasts of industrial growth in each 
air basin to estimate the effects of air quality standards on 
various industrial growth scenarios. These forecasts in turn 
could affect electricity demand. For example, the ARB's 
forecast may indicate that air quality standards will limit 
growth of a particular industry. Energy demand, therefore, 
may be reduced. The Commission and the ARB currently do not 
coordinate their respective forecasting efforts. The Commis-
sion and the ARB also use different forecasting methodologies. 
Agreement Between the ARB/APCD's and the Commission 
The agreement provides for increased cooperation between 
the Commission and the ARB in deciding on the compliance of 
power plants with state and federal air quality standards. Two 
significant features of the proposed agreement are: 
a) The ARB/APCD review of a proposed power plant would 
take place during the Commission's siting procedure. 
The agreement requires the applicant to submit during 
the notice of intention (NOI) stage, instead of the 
application for certification (AFC) stage, most of the 
detailed information which the ARB/APCD's need to 
determine whether a proposed power plant can be built 
at a particular site. 
b) If a proposed power plant cannot meet all applicable 
state air quality standards, the Commission can still 
certify the facility if, among other conditions, it 
meets federal air quality standards. 
The agreement applies to all power plants for which an APCD 
must issue an Authority to Construct permit. Its provisions 
will go into the Commission's administrative regulations govern-
ing NOI and AFC proceedings. The provisions of the agreement 
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will also be part of the NSR rules in the SIP. The agreement 
is summarized below. 
Notice of Intention Stage 
During the first phase of the NOI proceedings, the APCD or 
the ARB must submit a report to the Commission. The report 
would include: 
1) A "preliminary specific .. definition of Best 
Available Control Technology (BACT). 
2) A preliminary discussion of whether there is a 
"substantial likelihood .. that the plant can be 
approved at each site proposed in the NOI. 
3) A preliminary list of federal and state air quality 
regulations which the plant must meet. 
If none of the proposed sites is acceptable from an air 
quality standpoint, the ARB/APCD's may suggest, prior to the 
end of the nonadjudicatory hearings in the first phase of the 
NOI, an alternative site where the proposed facility is more 
likely to meet air quality standards. In such cases, the 
Commission may direct the NOI applicant to evaluate .. major 
siting constraints .. for presentation during the second (i.e., 
adjudicatory hearing) phase of the NOI. 
In its NOI decision, the Commission may not approve any 
site unless there is a 11 substantial likelihood .. that applicable 
air quality standards can be met at the site. If no such site 
is identified, and the Commission determines that a facilit~ is 
needed, it may select a single site that is most likely to meet 
air quality standards. 
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Application for Certification Stage 
Within nine months of the time an AFC is filed (six months 
if a 12-month AFC applies), the AFCD must submit its 11 final 
determination of compliance 11 • If the proposed facility complies 
with air quality standards, the local Air Pollution Control 
Office (APCO) specifies permit conditions, including BACT and, 
if necessary, emissions trade-offs. If the facility does not 
comply, the APCO would specify those rules and regulations which 
the facility violates and those with which it complies. The 
APco•s final determination is subject to appeal to the ARB. 
The Commission•s AFC decision must include 11 findings and 
conclusions 11 on the facility•s conformance with air quality 
standards, based on the APco•s final determination. If the 
facility complies, the Commission•s certificate must include all 
conditions necessary to maintain compliance. If the facility does 
not comply, the Com~ission mediates between the applicant and 
the ARB or APCD to 11 Correct or eliminate 11 the noncompliance. If 
the noncompliance cannot be corrected, the Commission may certify 
the facility if the following conditions are met: 
1) The Commission determines that the facility is required 
for the 11 public convenience and necessity 11 • 
2 ) T h e r e a r e n ·o t m o r e 11 p r u den t an d f e a s i b 1 e me a n s o f a c h i e v-
ing the public convenience and necessity 11 • 
3) The facility meets all 11 provisions and schedules required 
by the Clean Air Act 11 (i.e., federal standards). 
4) The facility meets all applicable air quality standards 
that can be met. 
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The APCO must issue a "permit to operate•• if the facility complies 
with the conditions in the Commission's certificate. 
Energy-Related Functions of t~e Public Utilities Commission27 
General Authority 
Article XII of the California Constitution creates the 
Public Utilities Commission (PUC) and provides for the PUC's 
authority over energy-producing facilities. Sections 3, 5, and 
6 give general authority to the PUC and to the Legislature for 
the purpose of regulating entities which provide power to the 
public. The PUC is given specific constitutional authority to 
fix rates and establish rules for all public utilities. 
Section 701 of the Public Utilities Code provides the 
general statutory authority to regulate public utilities. The 
PUC does not regulate municipally-owned utilities. 
Specific Procedures 
1) Ratemaking 
The PUC is charged with setting ••just and reasonable" 
rates for public utilities• services (Public Utilities 
Code, Section 728). T~e California Supreme Court, in 
Pacific Tel. & Tel. v. Public Utilities Commission (1965) 
described the PUC's general approach to ratemaking: 
••. to determine with respect to a •test period' 
(1) the rate base of the utility, i.e., value of 
the property devoted to public use, (2) gross 
operating revenues, and {3) costs and expenses 
allowed for rate-making purposes, resulting in 
(4) net revenues produced, sometimes termed 
•results of operatiqns•. Then, by determining 
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the fair and reasonable rate of return to be 
fixed or allowed the utility upon its rate base, 
and comparing the net revenue which would be 
achieved at that rate with the net revenue of the 
test period, the commission determines whether and 
how much the utility's rates and charges should be 
raised or lowered ... 
A utility initiates a rate case by filing an 
application with PUC. After an adjudicatory hearing, 
including sworn testimony and cross-examination, the 
PUC's decision is made by a majority vote of the five 
commissioners. After possible rehearings, the PUC's 
decision is appealable only to the California Supreme 
Court. The public is given an opportunity to participate 
in rate cases through informal hearings held in several 
locations within the area served by the utility seeking 
the rate increase.28 
The PUC has also developed special ratemaking pro-
cedures which provide for rate adjustments outside of 
general rate proceedings. These procedures were 
initiated because rising fuel costs and inflation have 
complicated general rate proceedings to the point where 
utilities experienced a lag time in PUC rate adjustments. 
2) Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity 
Public Utilities Code Section 1001 requires every 
gas and electric corporation under the PUC's jurisdiction 
to obtain from the PUC a Certificate of Public Convenience 
and Necessity (CPCN} before constructing facilities. 29 
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In the past, the Puc•s review of a utility•s proposal 
prior to issuing the CPCN constituted the power plant 
siting procedure. Currently, however, the Energy 
Commission•s (Commission) siting procedure supplants 
most of the Puc•s siting jurisdiction. Although utili-
ties must still obtain a CPCN, the puc•s siting 
jurisdiction is limited to the implications of a pro-
posed project on a utility•s financial standing and to 
the rate implications of a proposed project. Thus, 
using these two criteria the PUC may reverse the 
Commission•s decision to site a power plant by refusing 
to issue the CPCN. For example, the PUC could decide 
that a power plant which the Commission has certified 
will bankrupt the utility or impose an unfair burden on 
ratepayers. To avoid this possibility, the PUC parti-
cipates in Commission proceedings which will eventually 
require a CPCN. 
The PUC retains exclusive jurisdiction over electric 
transmission lines not directly related to power plants, 
and over all intrastate natural gas facilities. Only 
about 10% of California•s gas is categorized as intra-
state gas, however. The PUC also has exclusive authority 
to certify power plants which California•s investor-owned 
utilities choose to build outside the state. 
65 
PUC decisions on applications for a CPCN are made 
in formal hearings involving a commissioner and an 
administrative law judge. The PUC maintains that these 
formal proceedings are necessary in order to develop 
a record which will support PUC decisions if the 
decisions are appealed to the California Supreme Court. 
In deciding on whether to issue a CPCN, the PUC must 
comply with the provisions of the California 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). 
3) Forecasting 
As part of every general rate case, the PUC con-
ducts short-term forecasts (i.e., one or two years) of 
energy supply and demand. The PUC also conducts a 
three-year forecast of natural gas supply and demand 
on a semiannual basis for use in gas rate cases. 
The PUC conducts long-term natural gas forecasts 
{10-20 years) in connection with its responsibilities 
to assure an adequate supply of natural gas. The Puc•s 
10-year gas forecast is published annually. Although 
utilities are also required to submit their own 10-year 
gas forecasts to the PUC, the PUC maintains that its 
forecast is ~n ••independent assessment of supply and 
demand".30 
In carrying out its responsibilities concerning 
an adequate supply of electricity, the PUC relies on 
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the Commission•s long-range electricity forecasts. 
Recently, however, the PUC fssued an Order Instituting 
Investigation (OII) concerning the resource plans of both 
San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) and Pacific 
Gas & Electric Company (PG&E). According to the PUC, 
these investigations (OII 1 s No. 4 and 26, respectively) 
are not intended to duplicate the Commission•s forecast-
ing plans; the PUC maintains that these investigations 
will help the PUC participate meaningfully in future 
Commission proceedings by ••providing comments on finan-
cial and rate impacts of proposed facilities 11 .31 The 
PUC is also required (Public Resources Code Sections 
25302, 25303) to evaluate the 5-, 10-, and 20-year fore-
casts which utilities submit to the Commission. The Com-
mission uses these forecasts in preparing the Biennial 
Report. 
4) The PUC is generally responsible for the conservation 
efforts which affect utilities. These responsibilities 
include: 
Setting utility rates, including inverted rate 
structures, to reward customers who reduce their 
energy consumption. 
Establishing tariff rules to reduce waste and non-
essential uses of electricity. 
Determining appropriate levels of utility expenditures 
for cost-effective energy conservation. 
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Developing and adopting a utility Home Insulation 
Assistance and Financ{ng Program. 
Determining appropriate rules and general orders 
governing utility service quality including voltage 
standards. 
To implement these functions more effectively, the 
PUC established an Energy Conservation Team on 
January 1, 1976. The team is now part of the PUC's 
Utilities Division. 
The PUC uses its rate jurisdiction as an enforce-
ment mechanism for utility conservation efforts. The 
PUC may recommend a reduced rate of return if a utility 
does not demonstrate vigorous, imaginative and effective 
conservation efforts. The PUC claims that its conserva-
tion program has caused utilities to expand substantially 
their conservation activities during the past two years.32 
Unfortunately, there is no formal method for incorporat-
ing utilities• conservation efforts into the Commission's 
procedures. 
The Commission also has statutory authority over 
energy conservation. In general, the Commission con-
centrates on non-utility conservation efforts such as 
insulation standards, home appliance efficiency, resi-
dential and nonresidential building standards, and 
transportation. The Commission has promotional respon-
sibilities in conservation, such as domestic outreach 
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and educational programs. The Commission also inter-
venes in the PUC's conservation proceedings. 
5) Load Management 
Although the Commission has general authority to 
adopt cost-effective load management standards (Public 
Resources Code Section 25403.5), the PUC has a role in 
implementing the standards. For example, load manage-
ment may require a "time of use" rate structure which 
the PUC must approve. Through its rate jurisdiction in 
such cases, the PUC also determines whether a particular 
load management technique is cost-effective. 
6) Alternative Energy Sources 
a. Solar Energy 
PUC policy on solar energy is just now emerging. 
Through its ratemaking authority the PUC can provide 
incentives for solar development by, (1) providing 
higher rates of return for utilities investing in 
solar energy (Public Utilities Code, Section 454), 
or (2) by offering higher gas service priorities to 
customers who use solar equipment. The PUC's author-
ity to adopt lifeline rates for gas and electricity 
also affects solar development. Lifeline rates de-
termine whether solar energy is economical for some 
applications. 
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PUC regulation of utility involvement in solar 
energy is unclear. The PUC and Commission recently 
held joint hearings on utility involvement in solar 
energy; the PUC now intends to hold additional 
hearings on its own. Currently, utilities are 
required to obtain PUC approval before marketing 
solar equipment (Chapter 1102, Statutes of 1978). 
The PUC is also required to investigate the 
feasibility of a solar energy loan program 
(Chapter 1100, Statutes of 1978). 
b. Cogeneration and Geothermal 
As with solar energy, the PUC's jurisdiction 
over rates and utilities' returns on investments 
gives the PUC leverage to encourage the use of 
cogeneration and geothermal energy. 
The PUC recently required PG&E, Southern 
California Edison, and SDG&E to submit rate proposals 
to increase cogeneration and to identify their 
respective potential for cogeneration projects. The 
PUC subsequently issued a report which identified 
1,650 MW of cogeneration potential in the service 
areas of the three utilities. 
7) Electric Transmission Lines 
The PUC has jurisdiction over electric transmission 




Commission has jurisdiction over transmission lines from 
power plants to the first junction with an interconnected 
grid. 
In practice, the PUC and the Commission have dis-
agreed on the extent of their respective jurisdictions. 33 
The disputes are based on the definition of the junction 
with an interconnected grid . 
Review of Utility Research and Development Plans 
In the past, the PUC ganarally did hot allo~ utilities 
to use ratepayer's money for R&D. Within t~e past five 
years, however, the PUC has taken a different view of 
R&D, mostly as a result of dwindling energy resources. 
Now utilities are allowed reimbursement through rates 
for part of their R&D investments. The PUC obviously 
can influence the R&D priorities of utilities by speci-
fying which investments will be reimbursed. PU Code 
Section provides the authority for reimbursement for R&D 
through rates. Section 454 allows an increased rate of 
return for utilities investing in specified alternative 
energy projects. 
Conflicts Between PUC and Commission 
1) Siting 
Both the Public Utilities Commission and the Energy 
Commission issue certificates for power plants. As 
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stated previously, the PUC can deny a CPCN after the 
Commission has issued its certification. Thus, a 
utility can spend considerable time and money during 
the Commission's certification process only to have the 
PUC deny approval of the project. The PUC must 
coordinate its review with the Commission's siting 
process to provide an early decision on whether the 
utility can finance its proposal. Although the PUC is 
updating General Order (G.O.} 13la34 in an effort to 
provide better Commission/PUC coordination in the siting 
process, the CPCN may still add several months to the 
time required for approval of projects. 
The PUC's investigations of utilities' resource 
plans (Oil's No. 4 and 26) may duplicate parts of the 
Commission's planning process. As stated previously, 
recent legislation appears to have expanded the Com-
mission's role in resource plans. 
The PUC is in a position to influence state energy 
policy. For example, the PUC has adopted the policy that 
the state should use natural gas in power plants until a 
transition can be made to alternative energy sources. 
This policy appears to conflict with current Commission 
policy which appears to favor coal and oil. 
Energy-Related Functions of the State Water Resources Control Board 35 
General Authority 
The State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) and nine 
regional water control boards share responsibility for regulating 
water quality in the state. The SWRCB has additional authority 
to administer water rights. The general statutory authority of 
72 
the SWRCB and the regional boards is stated in Public Resources 
Code Sections 13150 et seq. 
Specific Procedures 
l) Water Quality 
The SWRCB's energy-related functions, as well as 
jurisdictional conflicts with the Commission, can be 
illustrated through the following examples. 
Example One: A utility discharging "once through .. 
cooling water to surface water must, under federal law 
(Clean Water Act), obtain a National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The SWRCB and the 
regional boards are the only agencies which the EPA 
authorizes to issue NPDES permits. 
Thermal pollution is the principal concern in once-
through cooling water discharges. Although the NPDES 
perm i t can i n c 1 u de 1 i m i t s on the d i s charge of heat, ·the 
federal government has not developed thermal pollution 
standards. The state, however, has developed 
stringent thermal pollution standards which are contained 
in the SWRCB's federally-required Thermal Plan. Thus, 
NPDES permits reflect state thermal pollution standards 
which have become "fed era 1 i zed" in the Thermal Plan. A 
question may arise whether the Commission has statutory 
authority to override the NPDES permit conditions. This 
jurisdictional issue probably will not arise for inland power 
plants which do not use once-through cooling water. 
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A similar jurisdictional problem concerns the 
federal requirement that cooling water intake structures 
use the 11 best technology for minimizing adverse environ-
mental impact[s]~ · on fish and other organisms. This 
requirement applies to both fresh water and ocean water 
intake structures. The Commission may have authority 
under state law to adopt a different definition of 11 best 
technology 11 than the SWRCB adopts. 
These examples demonstrate that the SWRCB and the 
regional boards occupy a position regarding water similar 
to the ARB/APco•s position with respect to federal law 
regarding air quality. 
Example Two: Some large power plants use evaporation 
ponds to dispose of cooling water. Although a NPDES 
permit is not required for evaporation ponds, a permit 
is required under state law because of possible adverse 
effects on the quality of groundwater. The SWRCB and 
the regional boards are authorized to administer this 
permit program. A question arises, however, whether the 
Commission has the authority to issue this permit for 
power plants. The SWRCB indicates that its cooperation 
with the Commission has prevented any jurisdictional 
conflicts over this issue. 
Example Three: The SWRCB, through its Clean Water 
Grants Program, funds sewage treatment facilities. The 
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SWRCB will make a special effort to coordinate the 
design of treatment facilities from which water can be 
reclaimed for power plant cooling, if the utilities' 
plans are available to the SWRCB as early as possible. 
2) Water Rights 
Before the SWRCB issues a right to appropriate 
surface water, including water for power plant cooling, 
it must make two findings: 
a. There is sufficient water available after the 
requirements of prior water rights have been 
satisfied. 
b. The intended use of water is reasonable, beneficial, 
and in the public interest. 
Both of these findings require the SWRCB to exercise 
discretion. So far, the SWRCB has accommodated the 
Commission's power plant siting process in its water 
rights decisions; utilities usually secure rights to 
cooling water before submitting a notice of intention 
(NOI) to the Commission. Thus, the issue of whether 
the Commission, instead of the SWRCB, has the authority 
to administer water rights for power plants has not 
arisen. 
The second finding offers additional opportunity 
for conflict, however. Article 2, Section X of the 
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California Constitution, which is the fundamental water 
rights law of the state, prohibits the waste or unreason-
able diversion of water. Furthermore, the SWRCB's Power 
Plant Cooling Policy strongly discourages the use of 
fresh inland water for power plant cooling. The policy 
states that the loss of inland water through evaporation 
in a power plant cooling facility may be considered an 
unreasonable use of inland water when general shortages 
occur. Thus, the question may arise whether the 
Commission or the SWRCB has the ultimate authority to 
decide if the use of inland fresh water for power plant 
cooling is reasonable. 
In his testimony before the Advisory Committee, 
Mr. William J. Miller, of the SWRCB, stated that the 
SWRCB and the Commission currently have a satisfactory, 
though informal, relationship in power plant siting cases. 
Miller suggested that the SWRCB's current statutory 
authority remain intact. Miller also stated that SWRCB 
is willing to have a member participate in appropriate 
portions of the Commission's proceedings. 
Energy-Related Functions of the State Solid Waste Management Board 
Although ACR 177 did not mention the Solid Waste Management 
Board (SWMB) as an agency whose authority conflicts with the 
Commission's, such conflicts may arise in two areas: (1) responsi-
bility for developing waste-to-energy programs and facilities, and 
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(2) the issuance of permits for power plants which generate 
solid waste and store the waste at the power plant site. 
Waste-to-Energy 
The SWMB is responsible for developing a research and 
development program for recovering solid wastes and converting 
the wastes to energy (Government Code, Section 66785). "This 
program includes the design, construction and testing of pilot 
equipment for processing solid wastes.36 The SWMB is also 
responsible for demonstrating the feasibility of recycling and 
converting agricultural wastes into synthetic fuels (Section 
66786.5). 
The Commission has similar responsibilities, including 
technical assessment studies on: 
l) Methods of recycling, extracting, processing, fabricating, 
handling, or disposing of materials, e~pecially materials 
which require large commitments of energy (Public 
Resources Code, Section 25602h). 
2) Methods of recycling materials and its effect on 
energy consumption (Section 25602i). 
3) Use of agricultural products, municipal wastes, and 
organic refuse as an energy source (Section 25602m). 
The SWMB suggests that it should have full authority over 
research and development of waste-to-energy projects and that the 
Commission should have authority over research and development 
in crops grown specifically for fuel (i.e., biomass conversion) •37 
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Permits for Solid Waste Disposal 
If California relies on coal-fired power plants in the 
future, solid waste resulting from coal combustion may become an 
issue in power plant siting. For example, Pacific Gas and 
Electric•s proposed coal-fired facility, Fossil 1 and 2, would 
generate more waste than disposal sites in the area can handle. 
Thus, the Fossil 1 and 2 site must have its own waste disposal 
area. Since all solid waste disposal areas must obtain permits 
from agencies other than the Commission, the question may arise 
whether the Commission has the authority to issue solid waste 
permits for power plants. 
Both the regional water quality boards and the county solid 
waste enforcement agencies, with the approval of the SWMB, issue 
permits for solid waste disposal facilities. 38 The SWMB is not 
required to approve the regional boards• permits; the permits may 
be appealed to the SWMB. If hazardous solid waste, as defined 
by the federal Resources Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 
(RCRA) is involved, the Department of Health, instead of the 
county solid waste enforcement agency, issues a waste facility 
permit. 
The regional water quality board permit and the county 
enforcement agency permit are issued under state law. Thus, 
Public Resources Code Section 25500 may give the Commission 
the authority to issue these permits for power plants. The 
Department of Health (DOH) permit for hazardous waste, however, 
is issued under the aegis of RCRA. Since the U.S. Environmental 
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Protection Agency (EPA) is generally unwilling to bifurcate its 
state-administered enforcement programs, the Commission probably 
could not issue this permit for power plants. 39 
Jurisdictional conflicts over solid waste have not been a 
serious problem in power plant siting cases. In the Sundesert 
nuclear facility siting case, a permit from the regional water 
quality board would have been required if the case had proceeded 
to the AFC stage. Since the Commission was willing to accept the 
regional board's permit conditions in the Sundesert case, the 
question of which agency issued the permit was immaterial. 40 In 
the Fossil l and 2 siting case, which is in the NOI stage 
(Docket No. 77-NOI-4), the nature of the solid waste is not 
sufficiently well-defined to determine if the waste is hazardous. 
The Commission is trying to form a task force on solid waste 
permits for power plants. This task force, which would include 
the SWMB, the DOH, and the State Water Resources Control Board, 
would attempt to specify early in the siting process the informa-
tion a utility must submit in order to comply with solid waste 
permit requirements. 
Energy-Related Functions of the California Coastal Commission 
General Authority 
The California Coastal Commission has general authority over 
conservation and -development in the coastal zone (Public Resources 
Code, Sections 30000 et seq.). 
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Specific Procedures 
The Coastal Commission has no permit authority over power 
plants in the coastal zone. The Coastal Commission does have 
authority (Section 30413), however, to map the coastal zone in 
such a way that some areas are designated as unsuitable for power 
plants. These areas, which are known as 11 designated areas .. , are 
often valuable coastal resources and are generally unsuitable for 
power plants because of geographical considerations. The Big Sur 
coast is an example of a designated area. The Commission is 
prohibited by law from siting power plants in designated areas unless 
the Coastal Commission makes specific findings (Section 25526a). 
During the mapping process, the Coastal Commission must 
consider the content of the Commission's most recent Biennial 
Report. Thus, the Coastal Commission is aware of the Commission's 
demand forecast when it maps the coast. Furthermore, the maps 
must be updated every two years. During the updating, previously 
undesignated areas may be designated and vice versa. 
The Coastal Commission completed its mapping task in 
September 1978. According to the maps, designated areas comprise 
about one-quarter of the coast. About one-half of the coast is 
mapped in such a way that designated and undesignated areas are 
interspersed. The final quarter of the coast is undesignated. 
Of this final quarter, one-half is currently under federal 
ownership. 
According to the Coastal Commission,41 this mapping approach 





plant sites. Utilities should look first at areas of the coast 
where power plants already exist; the second choice should be the 
undesignated quarter of the coast; the third choice would be the 
interspersion of designated and undesignated areas; and the fourth 
choice would be designated areas. 
The Coastal Commission may also participate in Commission 
siting proceedings. When a coastal power plant site is under 
consideration in a siting case, the Coastal Commission recommends 
terms and conditions for protection of coastal resources which the 
Commission must implement unless they are infeasible. 
Conflicts Between the Coastal Commission and the Commission 
Despite the existence of undesignated areas on the coast, a 
question remains whether the coastal power plant siting option, 
which implies the use of ocean water instead of fresh water, is 
available. The Warren-Alquist Act (Public Resources Code Section 
25516. 1) prohibits the Commission from certifying any facilities 
on a coastal site unless the coastal site has "greater relative 
merit•• than alternative sites.42 The term "greater relative 
merit 11 is not defined. Thus, given a choice between expanding 
facilities at a coastal site and constructing facilities at a 
new, inland site, the Commission could choose the inland site. 
Another source of conflict between the Coastal Commission 
and the Commission is the Coastal Commission•s classification of 
certain coastal areas as designated (i.e., unsuitable) for power 
plants but undesignated for other related uses, such as access to 
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seawater for a power plant further inland. In such 11 part1ally 
designated .. areas, a utility could build seawater access facilities, 
for example, without the Coastal Commission's approval. 
The Commission has expressed doubt about the legality of 
partial designation.43 Whether the courts will interpret partial 
designation as identical with total designation is unclear. The 
issue probably will not be decided until a utility proposes to 
build facilities in a partially designated area. 
Energy-Related Functions of the Department of Conservat i on 
The Division of Oil and Gas in the Department of Conservation 
regulates activities associated with geothermal energy production. 
The Division regulates drilling, casing requirements, steam flow, 
and maintenance for geothermal wells. The Department has 
received a grant from the U.S. Department of Energy to expedite 
geothermal development in the state. The grant will allow the 
Department to investigate federal geotherma l leasing practices; 
electrical transmission cor.ridor access; loca l planning policies; 
low temperature, direct heat applications for geothermal steam; 
and incentives for geothermal development. 
Energy-Related Functions of the Business and Transportation Agency 
The SolarCal Office in the Bus i ness and Transportation Agency 
is seeking to provide financial and regulatory incentives for 
solar energy development. SolarCal is also trying to develop 




equipment. The Office and t~e SolarCal Council, 38-member board 
appointed by the Governor, advises the Governor in solar energy 
issues. The Office and the Board are trying to develop a solar 
plan for California. The Office works closely with builders and 
financial institutions on solar projects and provides the "focal 
point" in state government for solar energy issues. 
Energy-Related Functions of the Office of Appropriate Technology 
The Office of Appropriate Technology (OAT) is part of the 
Office of Planning and Research. OAT was established by executive 
order to assist in and to encourage the development of small-
scale technology and the use of renewable resources. OAT is 
currently involved in alternative energy projects concerning 
wind, solar, and biomass. OAT administers a program to provide 
grants to individuals developing small-scale technologies. OAT 
also provides information to the public on renewable energy 
resources. 
Energy-Related Functions of the State Architect 
The State Architect encourages the use of conservation 
measures and solar energy in state buildings. 
This section on agencies' responsibilities demonstrates that 
several different agencies have authority to initiate research and 
development efforts for alternative energy technologies. This 
diverse responsibility is another example of the current lack of 
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ACR 177 created a 12-member advisory committee to assist 
the Joint Committee in determining what changes, if any, should 
be made in the organization of the state's energy-related func-
tions. The following persons served on the Advisory Committee: 
Roy Alper 
Director, California Citizens Action Group, Berkeley 
Michael Eaton 
Energy Coordinator, Sierra Club, Sacramento 
David Fogarty 
Senior Vice-President, Southern California Edison Company, 
Rosemead 
Thomas Graff 
Regional Counsel, Environmental Defense Fund, Berkeley 
Joseph Houghteling 
Chairman, Bay Conservation and Development Commission, 
Atherton 
Frederick Mielke 
Executive Vice President, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 
San Francisco 
Sandy Motley 
Councilwoman, City of Davis, Davis 
Michael Peevey 
President, California Council for Environmental and Economic 
Balance, San Rafael 
Phyllis Price 
Energy Director, California League of Women Voters, Salinas 
William Robertson 
Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Los Angeles County Federation 
of Labor, Los Angeles 
William Walbridge 
General Manager, Sacramento Municipal Utility District, 
Sacramento 
Leo Wyler 
Chairman of the Board, TRE Corporation, Los Angeles 
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The Advisory Committee met six times. Most of the meetings 
were devoted to taking testimony from representatives of those 
state agencies whose authority affects the energy regulatory 
process. The Advisory Committee heard from (in order of presen-
tation): 
Gene Varanini, Commissioner 
California Energy Commission 
William Ahern 
Ports and Energy Coordinator 
California Coastal Commission 
Frederick John, Executive Director 
California Public Utilities Commission 
William Miller 
Member, State Water Resources Control Board 
Tom Austin, Executive Director 
Air Resources Board 
Allen Pasternak, Commissioner 
California Energy Commission 
The Advisory Committee reached consensus on few issues. At 
first, the Advisory Committee appeared to be polarized -- half 
of the members sought substantial changes in the current regula-
tory process, including abolition of the Commission; the other 
half sought to maintain the Commission•s integrity while imple-
menting changes in the relationship between state agencies. At 
the November 29, 1978 meeting the members agreed, however, that 
subsequent discussions should address the question of whether 
there is a need in the state•s energy-related functions for: 
1. A well-articulated and understandable energy policy. 
2. Greater certainty in the regulatory process including 
coordinated decisions by the California Energy Commission, 
the Air Resources Board, the Water Resources Control 
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Board, the Public Utilities Commission, etc. 
3. Greater visibility in the supply planning. 
4. Political accountability. 
5. Increased public participation. 
6. Less legalistic procedures in order to facilitate public 
participation. 
Toward the end of the Advisory Committee's tenure, the 
members• opinions became diversified. Following the final meeting 
on January 3, 1979, each member submitted to the Joint Committee 
his or her individual recommendations on reorganizing the state's 
energy-related functions. 
The Joint Committee received as a separate document a com-
plete list of the issues on which the Advisory Committee voted 
at the final meeting, as well as each member's final statement. 
Those issues on which the Advisory Committee reached consensus 
at the final meeting are summarized below: 
Conclusions 
1) The existing organization of state government does not 
provide an articulate and understandable statement of 
state energy policy. 
2) The existing organization of state government does not 
provide certainty and coordination in the regulatory 
process (i.e., forecasting, determination of technologies 
and fuel types, review of supply plans, selection of site 
for facilities). 
3) Public participation in the Commission's proceedings, 
other than siting cases, is far from adequate. 
4} The existing organization of state government does not 
provide for an adequate amount of political accountability. 
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Recommendations 
1) As a general principle, two regulatory agencies should 
not perform the same regulatory function. 
2) A Resources Management Council should be created by the 
Governor to help coordinate and ensure communication 
among executive branch agencies. 
3) The Legislature should adopt a unified timetable for all 
findings, determinations and certificates necessary for 
the siting process. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION'S EFFECTIVENESS 
AND OF ALTERNATIVES FOR REORGANIZATION 
In executing its energy-related responsibilities, state govern-
ment performs three functions~ The · firlt function is establis~ing energy 
policy: The Governor and the Legislature currently assume this 
role. Second is articulating energy policy: Articulation refers 
to defining how policies will be carried out; it is a planning 
function. Third is implementing policy: State agencies ar.e 
responsible for both policy articulation and implementat~on. 
None of these functions may be performed effectively by 
itself. Energy policy cannot be carried to the implementation 
stage while conflicting policies and planning efforts exist. 
Thus, the state must assure that its energy policies are consist-
ent with other resource policies and that all agencies• planning 
and implementation efforts are well coordinated. 
This section will examine the following aspects of the state's 
energy-related responsibilities: 
1) The consistency of the state's energy policies. 
2) The degree of coordination in the state's energy 
planning efforts. 
3) The degree of political accountability which the 
structure of the state's energy-related functions 
allows. 
4) The internal organization of the Energy Commission. 
5) The effectiveness of the state's efforts to develop 
alternative energy technologies. 
6) Public participation. 
7) The problems inherent in combining regulatory and 
administrative functions in one agency. 
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Energy Policy 
The purpose of energy policy is to guide and direct govern-
mental and private sector resources into areas which will benefit 
the public. State policy should provide the framework within 
which the various entities concerned with energy development and 
consumption can plan for the future. The state, therefore, must 
make its policy known. The policy mu~t be articulated through 
plans and regulations, and implemented by the responsible agencies. 
The Legislature and the Governor have established certain 
overall energy policies. It ts clear that nuclear energy shall 
not be used until certain issues regarding the disposal of long-
lived radioactive wastes are solved. 1 Geothermal energy, repower-
ing of existing power plants (the conversion of an existing steam 
cycle plant to one with both a steam cycle and a gas turbine), 
power plants using other than commercially available technologies, 
and cogeneration plants have all received the de facto approval 
of the Legislature by reason of the special, expedited siting 
2 procedures which have been required for these sources. The 
Governor and Legislature have arro·cons-1Cfered--propo-s.aTs. to -;~pe-dite ­
the siting of coal-ftred power plants. 3 Alternative technologies, 
such as solar energy, have received special tax incentives. 
The Energy Commission, in its AB 1852 report, as well as in 
subsequent statements before the Legislature, has announced that 
coal and domestic California oil should be the base load fuels 
for the immediate future. The PUC, in its LNG decision, declared 
that natural gas should be the transition fuel to the solar energy 
society. 4 The ARB, despite earlier pronouncements during prepara-
tion of the AB 1852 report, argues that combined cycle power plants 
may pose substantial problems 1n meetin·g·-a"fr--quiiit~y standards due 
92 
to the necessity for substantial pollution trade-offs, and has 
proposed rules in favor of using natur~l gas when it is avail-
able.5 Finally, the federal government has stated that "natural 
gas or petroleum shall not be used as a primary energy source for 
new electric power plants and no new electric power plant may be 
constructed without the capacity to use coal or any other alternate 
fuel as a primary energy source". 6 There are limited exceptions to 
this pol icy. These elements or !: state energy pol icy· appear.- to _be 
inconsistent and are at least confusing and uncoordinated. 
The Commission•s Biennial Report was to have focused policy 
alternatives for the Legislature and the Governor. The environ-
mental impacts, the costs, and the feasibility of various 
alternatives were to be assessed. 7 To accomplish these objectives, 
coordination and knowledge of other agencies• permit process 
requirements is necessary. The first Biennial Report failed to 
provide this coordination. The reason for this failure was not 
an oversight or error on the part of the Commission. The Warren-
Alquist Act places the Commission in the position of lead energy 
agency without the authority necessary to require coordination 
with other agencies. For example, there is no requirement for the 
ARB or the local air pollution control districts to coordinate 
their regulatory or planning activities with the Commission. While 
the Commission may not have vigorously attempted such coordination, 
it has no authority to demand such coordination. The second 
Biennial Report, due in the spring of 1979, may make improvements 
in analysis, but there is no guarantee of increased coordination. 
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The Commission's first Biennial Report could not have been 
expected to provide the kind of guidance necessary for policy 
articulation. The agency was new and still experiencing start-up 
problems. In addition, the Warren-Alquist Act dealt almost 
exclusively with electrical energy policy, and not overall energy 
policy. The Report should have provided, however, the focal point 
for conflict identification and resolution. 
Thus, despite several legislative attempts to increase the 
state's ability to define energy policy and plan for future needs, 
California does not have a declarative and understandable energy 
policy. Elements of a policy exist, but they are confused, ill-
planned, and unfocused. 
Policy Articulation: fhe - Planning Function 
The Warren-Alquist Act did not provide for the state to 
specify energy development plans. Instead, it established a 
planning process which has three phases: the Biennial Report, 
the Notice of Intention (NOI), and the Application for Certifica-
tion (AFC). At each stage the public interacts with the Commis-
sion and an applicant. Each stage progressively narrows the 
issues, from the broad generic issues in the Biennial Report, to 
the specific issues of plant design in the AFC. 
The present energy planning framework requires the state's 
utilities to submit forecasts of future electricity demand and 
to indicate the resources which will be required to meet demand. 
The Commission examines these foreeasts, reviews them independently, 
and adopts an official state forecast. 
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The forecast is contained in the Biennial Report for 5 ,' 12, 
and 20 years. As part of the Report, the Commission must also 
determine which technologies are av~il~ble for use in the state 
and the relative merits of each. This "br~cketing" of technolo-
gies is then used as the criterion to judge alternatives proposals 
at the NOI stage. 
Unfortunately, planning by state government has not led to 
more certainty that our energy needs will be met and has not pro-
vided guidance to utilities and other governmental entities on 
preferred energy sources. The process is now characterized by 
multiple, disjointed and uncoordinated planning activities which 
do not accurately reflec_t ._energy-·needs. --
Despite the passage of Warren-Alquist, there is no central 
agency which coordinates energy policy and provides for its 
implementation. Pieces of energy policy are articulated by the 
Commission, the PUC, the ARB, and others, but there is little consist-
ency among these agencies. Without the early involvement of these 
agencies and their analyses of the impacts, potential, and feasi-
bility of various energy options, there can be little real 
planning for future energy resources. 
For example, there has been little or no coordination between 
the preparation of the Commission•s Biennial Report and the pre-
paration of local and regional elements of the State Implementation 
Plan for air pollution control. The State Implementation Plan 
(SIP) is prepared by local and regional air pollution control 
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districts, under the guidance of the State Air Resources Board. 
The Plan, which is a requirement of federal law, is to contain 
all regulations and control programs which are required to 
achieve and maintain federal ambient air quality standards. 
Since air quality is the principal constraint governing the use 
of many types of energy sources, it would seem imperative that 
the Biennial Report and air quality planning be coordinated. 
Unfortunately, this has not been the case. 
To illustrate, several draft : local airt quality management plans 
assume future base load capacity from nuclear plants. For 
example, San Diego County's plan includes power from Sundesert; 
the Association of Bay Area Governments' (ABAG) plan includes 
power from other "proposed" nuclear plants. 8 These plans are 
inconsistent with the Legislature's nuclear policies. The EPA 
noted this inconsistency in its comments on the ABAG plan. 
Furthermore, several local air quality plans assume that a sub-
stantial proportion of existing fossil fuel-fired capacity will 
be retired. This assumption is inconsistent with the Commission's 
policy to encourage repoweri~g of existi~g oil plants. 
Moreover, the Commission stressed in its first Biennial 
Report the benefits of cogeneration and estimated a 2000 MW 
cogeneration potential in the state. 9 This-estimate-was --made-
without considering whether local air quality plans take into 
account the emissions trade-offs necessary for future c~genera­
tion projects. The South Coast Air Quality Management Dtstrict's 
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plan, for example, does not include cogeneration projects. 10 This 
lack of coordination between the Commission and air pollution 
control districts is due partly to the Commission's belief that 
cogeneration projects should be exempt from trade-offs require-
ments. A review of state and federal air quality laws indicates, 
however, that such exemptions are not possible without statutory 
changes. Thus, the Biennial Report did not properly coordinate 
the state's energy and air quality policies with respect to cogen-
eration. Coordination between the Commission and the ARB an 
cogeneration did not begin until 1978 when the cogeneration poten-
tial from the oil fields in Kern County was threatened by a 
proposed ARB rule. 11 
While the ARB and local air pollution districts, and not the 
Commission, should be held responsible for the contents of the 
SIP, its importance to the viability of the Commission's Biennial 
Report cannot be underestimated. The recent agreement between 
the Commission and ARB will go a long way toward streamlining the 
approval process for specific energy projects. There remains a 
need, however, to integrate air quality and other constraints into 
the Commission's process of evaluating preferred energy sources. 
Thus, the agreement addresses the siting process, but not the 
planning process. Specific constraints to the development of 
energy sources should be carefully evaluated in a format such as 
state or regional supply plans, rather than the present project-
by-project review. 
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The PUC and the SWRCB also eng~ge in planni~g and r~gulatory 
activities according to their own policies . . The PUC provides for 
the future capital investment and research and development activi-
ties of the private utilities through rate cases. The SWRCB has 
declared policy on the use of inland water for power plant use. 
Thus, each has a planning process which is disconnected from the 
Biennial Report but which has a profound effect upon energy develop-
ment and use. Furthermore, within its own planning and regulatory 
process, an agency can disagree on energy policy and impacts. 
Witness the ARB statement on the feasib1lity of s 1T'fng - c.oai in 
Southern C'alffor-ma and the local air-pollufion·--contro ,-d.i s-trict 
officer's statement to the contrary.12 
Even in the areas where the planning process is more prescribed 
and is intended to be integrated by statute, there have been dis-
putes and uncoordinated activity. The Coastal Commission is re-
quired by statute to take the Commission's comments on its designa-
tion process into consideration before it designates parts of the 
coast as unsuitable for power plant locations. 13 The Commission 
has participated in this designation process and on July 18, 1978, 
requested that the Coastal Commission not proceed with its proposed 
designation until the Commission and the Coastal Commission could 
jointly determine if the remaini~g areas of the coast could accommQ-
date new power plants. The Commission argued that although the 
Coastal Commission left 27% of the coast undesignated, a closer 
inspection revealed that of the 27%, 11% was in federal hands and 
13% was located in areas known to be unsuitable for power plant 




The Commission stated that of this 3%, it was not known whether a 
power plant or any other major facility could be constructed.14 
The Coastal Commission passed the proposed designation over these 
objections, and provided only 15 minutes for Commission comment. 
Another notable example of this lack of coordination and 
planning occurred in the Sundesert case before the Commission. 
The NOI had been approved by the Commission and the issue of an 
exemption from the nuclear waste law was being debated by the 
Legislature. The issue of San Diego Gas and Electric's ability 
to finance the project was raised in the NOI and the issue was to 
be a major point for resolution in the AFC. Subsequently, the 
PUC indicated that San Diego Gas and Electric could not finance 
their proposed share of the project. Both the declaration by the 
PUC and the decision to deal with financing in the AFC could have 
increased delays and the cost of arriving at a decision. 
Uncertainty also results from the planning procedures of 
the Commission itself. The Commission is mandated to certify 
sufficient facilities to meet forecasted demand. Demand fore-
casting by the state was to narrow debates r~garding how much 
electrical energy would be needed and to provide a basis for 
determining "legitimate" need. Once a demand forecast is adopted, 
. . . . . 
utilities could then plan to meet the demand with resources of 
their own choosing and submit applications to the Commission for 
approval. This process should supply an element of certainty 
that future needs will be met. 
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There is, however, some doubt as to how well this process 
has functioned. In its testimony before the Advisory Committee, 
the Commission indicated that future needs would indeed be met. 
The Commission indicated that its adopted forecast showed a need 
for 23,800 MW of new generation by 1990, of which 23,777 MW were 
under construction, under review by the Commission, or in the 
planning stages. 15 The initial list of projects included 2400 MW 
of power from the Stanislaus Nuclear Power Project--a project 
which is doubtful under current state policy; it included 1500 MW 
of power from a Southern California Edison coal plant and 1000 MW 
from a Department of Water Resources project which are probably 
mutually exclusive, and several thousand megawatts of combined 
cycle oil plants which are restricted by federal policy and may 
have air quality difficulties. In a subsequent submittal to the 
Advisory Committee,1 6 the Commission ~ltered some of the above 
resources (e.g., deleting Stanislaus}. 
Even if all of the above resources were to prove feasible, 
the Commission would have to certify every plant in the resources 
plan in order to meet its mandate under Warren-Alquist. It 
would also have to satisfy the requirements of CEQA that alterna-
tives to the projects are exam in e.d. It is (fo-ul>l ful--w·he_t .her sub-
stantial consideration could be given to alternatives under these 
conditions, given the lead times and planning necessary for large 




The Commission indicated recently that electricity growth 
was not expected to be as high as it has been in the past. The 
Commission indicated that growth in electricity sales is expected 
to be lower than the 4.2% projected by utilities and more near 
the 1.9% which it has averaged over the past six years. (This is 
electricity sales in kilowatt hours which refers to electricity 
sold over time; it is distinguished from peak demand which is the 
amount of electricity required on a system at any given time. 
Utilities must have enough capacity to meet peak demand.) The 
Commission also indicated that if growth does slow down as the 
past trend indicates, then utilities could defer 2000 MW of 
capacity in 1985 and 6000 MW in 1990. The above figures are 
based on a 2.7% growth rate in electric generating capacity which 
the Commission, derived by taking the simple average of figures 
represent average growth in electricity sales (1.9%) and in annual 
peak demand (3.5%) over the past several years. It is unlikely 
that the forthcoming electrical forecast in the Biennial Report 
will be at this level or will be derived in the same manner. 
These interim forecast a-5-se-ss-m-ents--addto- the--conlusfon ·an·d·- -- -- --·. --· -
uncertainty in the planni~g process. 
The final issue in this area is the nature of the Commission 
"mandateu to meet future demand. The Commission has stated that 
"This mandate distinguishes the Commissi.on from most other passive 
licensing agencies and commits the state to playi~g an active role 
in assuring that electrical energy needs are met".l 7 This is 
indeed a distinguishing feature of the Warren-Alquist Act, but 
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there are questions about its operation and viability. The man-
date is met, presumably, "by developing alternative ways of meet-
ing electrical energy needs and deciding which alternatives are 
realistic and reasonable and.~ .. implementing the choices".lS 
These alternatives are tested against applications in the NOI 
process. The difficulty with this procedure is that it occurs 
in the latter stages of the regulatory process. If an alternative 
is found, will there be time, political will, and an applicant to 
pursue the alternative? If an applicant does not wish to pursue 
the alternative, what will happen? In the AB 1852 alternative 
resource plan this situation arose: The Commission indicated 
that repowering of Silvergate units 3 and 4 was a·-~)artiif - alterna­
tive to Sundesert. San· Diego -Gas· a·na·Tiectr rc· fndicafe-d the 
repowering was not feasible and did not pursue the option and 
choosing instead to seek ·power- fr'om __ __ o_u t-.: of-~ state sources. 
There are no incentives or procedures to operationalize the 
Commission's "mandate" to site needed facilities. - In terms of 
planning, even if such incentives or procedures existed, they 
would be exercised too late to be effective. The results are 
either failure to meet future demand or the loss of real alterna-
tives because of time and economic constraints. 
To summarize, the energy planning process is fractured in 
California. It is characterized by little coordination between 
agencies and little integration during the various planning 
stages. Each agency has ifs- ·own· p-roc-es·s-an.dpoYfc.ie.s whfch it 
follows, and each is disconnected formally from the Biennial 
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Report process. The results have been increased costs to the rate-
payer, unclear planning procedures for utilities in the state, 
and increased uncertainty in planning for future energy needs. 
Political Accountability 
Energy development and consumption are important considera-
tions in all social, economic, and environmental issues. The 
public, therefore, has a vital interest in energy decisions. 
State government must provide a clear decision-making structure 
which allows the public to demonstrate, through the political 
process, its degree of satisfaction with the decisions being made. 
Thus, government officials and agencies must remain in a position 
of political accountability. 
The current energy decision-making structure in state govern-
ment does not provide for political accountability. Responsibility 
for energy decision is not clearly assigned. Neither policy 
development nor planning functions are assigned to one individual 
or agency. 
For example, in a recent letter to the U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE), the Chairman of the Commission strongly urged the 
federal government to classify California's heavy crude oil as an 
alternate energy source under the National Energy Act. 19 Although 
this policy could affect the course of California's energy develop-
ment plans, it is difficult to determine who was making this 
policy. The issue was not brought before the full Commission for 
approval or discussion. Is it the Chairman's policy? The 
Governor's? The Commission's? 
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The Sundesert project provides another example. The Com-
mission approved Sundesert in the NOI stage. The L~gislature 
subsequently denied Sundesert a statutory exemption from the 
nuclear waste laws, largely as a result of the Commission's 
recommendation. The PUC determined that San Diego Gas and 
Electric could not finance the entire project. Who, or what 
agency, was responsible for halting the Sundesert project? 
Solar energy development is another area where responsibility 
is assigned to several different agencies. The Commission has 
the largest share of state resources for solar energy programs, 
particularly those relating to the solar tax credit. The 
SolarCal office and the SolarCal Council take some responsibility 
for promoting solar energy in new homes, but so does the Commis-
sion. A third actor is the Office of Appropriate Technology (OAT) 
which promotes passive energy designs and structures that use 
renewable resources. A fourth is the Department of Housing and 
Community Development with its solar loan program. 
This situation exists in other areas. The PUC makes its 
decision on a certificate of public convenience and necessity for 
new facilities as much as nine months after the Commission has 
issued its certificate for construction of the facility. The 
Commission is responsible for conservation programs, but the PUC 
and OAT also have conservation responsibilities. Electrical 
forecasting is the responsibility of the Commission and gas 
forecasting the responsibility of the PUC. 
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In the energy field, those state agencies with the most 
responsibility (i.e., the Energy Commission and the PUC) have the 
least political accountability. Both are bodies with members 
sitting for fixed terms. Commissions are n.oted for their lack of 
accountability. In 1971, the President's Advisory Council on 
Executive Organizations (Ash Council) concluded: 
Independent regulatory agencies headed by collegial 
bodies do not, and propably cannot, provide for the 
political accountability required to insure public 
responsibility. 
A serious flaw of the collegial structure is an 
inability to fix responsibility due to the inherent 
diffusion of authority among relatively anonymous 
co-equal members. In addition, appointment for 
fixed terms gives Commissioners a degree of inde-
pendence that may serve to protect them from improper 
influence, but w~s n~B intended to allow them to 
become unrespons1ve. 
Independence among co-equal members and insulation from 
political influence may be highly desirable in regulatory bodies 
whose responsibilities are adjudicatory. When such bodies are 
delegated program responsibilities, it becomes genuinely difficult 
to determine who is actually running the program. 
Internal Organization of the Commission 
The Warren-Alquist Act empowers the Chairman of the Commission 
to direct the staff in accordance with the policies of the Com-
mission. This provision makes the role of the Executive Director 
unclear and has reduced the Director's authority. The Chairman's 
vaguely defined responsibility for staff activities may hav~ 
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encouraged other Commissioners to involve themselves in adminis-
trative matters. In any event, individual Commissioners fr~­
quently interact with staff on specific matters--e.g., preparation 
of the electricity f~recast, promotion of solar energy, etc. 
This involvement reduces staff independence, blurs the distinction 
between the adjudicatory role of Commissioners and the administra-
tive role of the staff, and provides for a poor allocation of 
staff resources. 
· -- ---- -· 
In most organizations, the chief administrative officer is 
responsible for the operation of day-to-day affairs. This person 
ensures that key projects are progressing, reviews staff products, 
and sets program goals and procedures. In the Energy Commission 
structure, the Chairman, and at times the members of the Commis-
sion play this role. The result is that the role of the Executive 
Director is not well defined. Does he work directly for the 
Chairman? Is he the person responsible for staff activities? Is 
the staff answerable to the Director, to the Chairman, or to a 
committee of the Commission? 
Even the Chairman•s role in this area is not clear, for while 
the statute may call for the Chairman to direct the staff, all the 
Commissioners at times become involved with staff products and 
resources. The insights of the Ash Council may be instructive in 
this situation. It noted that "multiheaded management may also 
result in a misallocation of agency resources in the absence of 
agreement on well-defined priorities. While a Commission chairman 
may have theoretical authority to direct staff activities, as a 
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practical matter the staff will be inclined to respond to all 
Commissioners. Thus, allocation of staff resources becomes 
difficult to control ... 21 Another aspect of Commissions which 
results in staff responding to all Commissioners is the need to 
obtain a majority vote. 
Misallocation of resources can easily occur when management 
is performed by a Commissioner. The interests of individual Com-
missioners differ and, as a result, program areas of individual 
interest are emphasized when there may be areas with more attrac· 
tive opportunities for results. This occurs at the Commission 
when the program preferences of various Commissioners are intro-
duced into staff budgets without a systematic set of priorities. 
The Auditor General recently noted that the Commission has spent 
millions of dollars for its research program without setting 
priorities and has focused its resources in areas with relatively 
low energy potentia1. 22 In summary, this situation is a good 
example of resource allocation based on the interests of various 
Commissioners rather than on a system of carefully defined 
priorities. 
The statutory direction of staff by the Chairman also reduces 
staff independence. It may sometimes be difficult to tell where 
staff products end and Commissioner decisions begin. The Biennial 
Report, for example, is the central regulatory document for the 
state. More than one Commissioner is helping to draft this docu-
ment and is reviewing and approving outlines and forecast results. 
Commissioners, after participating in the drafting of the Report 
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are then to sit in judgment on it and hear arguments for its 
revision; a task they cannot expect to conduct with the requisite 
dispassion. The staff, on the other hand, is expected to present 
an independent view and defend its product--a task they cannot 
perform with the necessary freedom or vigor if they have not had 
a completely free hand in preparing the initial Report. These 
overlaps in the functions of staff and Commissioners result from 
a structural flaw which combines r~gulatory and administrative 
functions. 
Alternatives Development Program 
One of the more novel features of the Warren-Alquist Act is 
its mandates for the development of alternative energy sources 
that are of unique benefit to the State. The Act encourages 
research and promotional activities to accelerate the development 
of these alternatives. There is, however, doubt whether in the 
four years since its creation the Commission has carried out 
these mandates. Several studies have noted the Commission's lack 
of precision in defining development goals and objectives and its 
failure to establish research priorities. Inadequate and unde-
fined objectives have reduced the state's contribution to develop-
ment programs and have limited the use of alternatives in resource 
planning. 
In the last two budget years, the Legislative Analyst has 
criticized the Commission's research and development program. In 
his fiscal 1978-79 analysis of the budget, the Analyst stated 
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that the Commission's research budget contained: 
...... insufficient detail with respect to the purpose, 
expected products and timeliness of proposed research 
projects. Of major importance is that the report 
lacks precision in stating what the Commission would 
do with the results of the proposed study or research. 
In many cases, our discussions with the Commission's 
staff indicate that plans are, in fact, incomplete 
or vague and that the problem lies d~~per than the 
semantic differences in the report." 
This same lack of precision was noted by the Auditor General 
in his recent report on the Commission's research program. The 
report states that 11 the current planning process is insufficient 
to ensure maximum benefits from future resources spent on research 
of energy alternatives 11 • 24 The report recommends a number of 
changes to insure that research projects are ranked in order of 
priority, that quantifiable objectives and milestones are estab-
lished, that literature search is conducted before research is 
begun, that research projects receive peer review, and that a 
formal monitoring system is established. 
Without clear directions and sound management practices, the 
state's alternatives program cannot contribute significantly to 
the acceleration of alternative resources development. Policy has 
not been established clearly in this area and continues to suffer 
from a lack of well-defined objectives. This vague direction and 
lack of planning indicates that the state's efforts in alternative 
energy development are inadequate. 
Public Participation 
Public participation in energy decisions is reduced because 
there is no articulated and understandable energy policy. Public 
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participation is affected by an inconsistent commitment the state 
has made to providing the public with the means to participate. 
Each of the several agencies responsible for energy planning and 
programs has different procedures for public input. 
The Commission recently revised its procedures in the siting 
cases to provide for more informal hearings. It has also in-
creased the role of the 'Public Advisor and the Commission's 
ability to attract the public's interest. These activities are 
not replicated by other agencies, such as the ARB and PUC. These 
agencies play a more traditional role by providing the public with 
time to comment on proposed decisions, but have no institutional 
program for the public's involvement ·tn the decision process, even 
though their decisions are essential ingredients in energy use 
and development. 
Providing consistent procedures for public participation 
would assure that energy decisions are made with substantial 
involvement as well as comment by the public. Energy agencies 
need to address this issue. 
Combining Regulatory and Administrative Processes 
The Warren-Alquist Act gives the Commission responsibility 
for the four major energy functions: planning and forecasting, 
power plant siting, conservation and alternatives development. 
In theory, placing these responsibilities in one agency provides 
for a comprehensive and systematic analysis of energy problems and 
options. The combination insures that the interrelationships 
among each of these functions are not lost by separating their 
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administration. The effectiveness of each function is increased 
because these interrelationships are recognized by common admini-
stration. 
The Warren-Alquist Act also combines two processes. The 
Commission has both regulatory and administrative responsibilities. 
The regulatory process requires an open forum for debate and for 
weighing evidence from all interested parties. A commissioner in 
this role is required to be a dispassionate trier of fact; he or 
she should be as free as possible from prejudice. The administra-
tive process, on the other hand, requires program development and 
operation, policy analysis, and advocacy. An administrator in 
this role must exercise policy leadership by proposing solutions 
to general problems and advocating policy preferences. Thus, each 
of the two processes has distinct features. The regulatory process 
ope~ates primarily on a case-by-case basis and renders final 
decisions; the administrative process proposes alternatives and 
promotes their adoption. 
The Warren-Alquist Act has placed the same individual in the 
impossible dual role of judge and advocate. The integrity and 
credibility of the regulatory process is reduced by the perception 
that it is compromised for administrative goals. The regulatory 
process becomes viewed as a vehicle for the effectuation of adminis-
trqtive policy to the extent that the judge in the regulatory 
process is also an advocate of policies which can influence that 
process. 
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Many of the functions performed by the Commission are 
implemented through both the regulatory and administrative 
process. The Commission's conservation program, for example, 
requires the adoption of building and appliance standards and the 
promotion of conservation through education and outreach programs. 
Power plant siting requires the certification of proposed sites 
and facilities and also the early site screening and ranking to 
plan for future development. The development of alternative 
technologies may require demonstration projects and also the 
licensing of these same projects in the siting process. The 
Commission's structure gives commissioners final authority for 
both regulatory and administrative pr.ocesses. 
For example, on February 1, 1979, the SWRCB held a workshop 
on the proposal of the Department of Water Resources (DWR) to 
construct a coal facil -ity to · pro"duc-e electriCity -fo·r-rflesfate " 
Water Project. At this workshop, the Chairman of the Energy Com-
mission urged DWR to use coal-fired power plants and indicated 
that coal is environmentally safe. This advocacy would be 
important for any effort to develop a program for use of particu-
lar resources, but the fa-ct that tnis same 1ndlvlaifar-w1lT-als_o _____ _ 
be asked to sit in judgment of this particular project compromises 
his adjudicatory role. The Chairman's advocacy for a particular 
fuel, proper in an administration process, is imprudent when com-
bined with a regulatory process that requires impartial judgment. 
Another example is the recent memorandum sent to members of 
the Advisory Committee. This memorandum was to update the fore-
cast and give an initial indication of available or planned 
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resources to meet needs. The memorandum indicated that elec-
trical demand showed a decrease over the past several years and 
the trend was expected to continue. This lower demand figure 
would allow the state•s utilities to defer 2000 MW of planned 
construction by 1985 and 6000 MW by 1990. This memorandum was 
signed by a commissioner who will soon be asked to make an 
independent judgment to adopt a forecast and hear all issues 
openly and objectively. This is a difficult situation when an 
initial judgment has been made. 
This combination of the regulatory and administrative processes 
also reduces the resources devoted to promotional programs. There 
is a tendency in any system that contains elements of the regu-
latory and administrative processes for the regulatory process to 
dominate the system. The regulatory process is one in which the 
immediate needs for information and staff resources are dramatic. 
The regulatory process generates most of the controversy and 
attention from the public and the political bodies of the state. 
If the theory of the 11 pinching shoe 11 or 11 squeaky wheel 11 have any 
validity, they will operate here. 
Evidence of this drift in resources toward regulatory 
activity is already apparent. Currently, over 60 percent of the 
Commission budget is devoted to regulatory activity. The trend in 
the last two budget years has been to reduce the promotional 
activities in far greater proportions than other areas. The 
Governor•s 1978-79 proposed budqet had 241 person-years devoted to 
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conservation and alternatives development. ·The 1979-80 proposed 
budget has 152 person-years devoted to these same areas. While 
all programs in the Commission were reduced in recent years, the 
siting and assessments programs were reduced less (12%) than 
conservation {50%) or alternatives development ll9%) from the 1978-79 
proposed budget. In addition, the reductions within the conser-
vation program, itself, were made by reducing promotional 
activity and maintaining regulatory programs. 
Another useful indication of where institutional energy is 
applied is the time spent by decision-makers on each of these 
areas. An examination of the Commisston calendar for January 29, 
1979, through March 28, 1979, shows over 75% of the hearing days 
are devoted to siting cases or regulations, and the remaining 25% 
devoted to business meetings or the Biennial Report. 
Commissions are compelled both by public pressure and the 
law to concentrate on the regulatory process. Committees of 
commissions, formed for regulatory purposes, tend to absorb 
resources without a clear view of how their activities affect 
the total quality of the Commission, because the press of cases 
is directly related to their reputation and role as judges. The 
Warren-Alquist Act has "built in" thes~ conflicts; they are real 
and they are damaging, but they are avoidable. 
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OPTIONS FOR REORGANIZATION 
ACR 177 requires the examination of three basic options for 
reorganizing energy functions. These options are: (1) reorgani-
zing the Energy Commission; (2) replacing the Energy Commission 
with a new or alternate agency; and (3) reallocating functions 
among the various agencies with energy responsibilities. There 
are other variations of these three alternatives, but this section 
discusses only the three options in ACR 177. Each of the three 
options will be presented with an explanation and the essential 
arguments for or against its adoption. 
REORGANIZING THE ENERGY COMMISSION 
This option would retain the Energy Commission with most or 
all of its present authority and would make changes to the 
Commission's processes and functions. External change, such as 
the creation of a Resource Council, and internal changes, such 
as the election of the Chairman of the Commission by his peers, 
and separating the responsibilities of the staff and the 
Commissioners, are some of the reorganizational options. In 
addition, changes to the Commission's processes and programs, such 
as a common timetable for all agencies' reviews in siting propo-
sals, are included in this option, as well as resource planninq. 
Resource Council 
A Resource Council could be created either bv executive 
order or by statute. The Council would be composed of the heads 
of the various departments or agencies in state government which 
are responsible for resource management or regulation. The 
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Council would be chaired by the Governor, or his designee, and 
would be responsible for coordinating the activities of the 
various departments to ensure that resource policies do not con-
flict with resource programs. The Council would provide political 
accountability for resource and energy decisions by making the 
Governor responsible for coordinating major resources programs. 
Regulatory coordination could be ensured by requiring the relevant 
agencies to provide input to regulatory processes in a timely 
manner. For example, the ARB would be required to comment on a 
time certain basis on an NOI which is before the Energy Commission. 
The ARB would also be required to comment on the feasibility of 
proposals in the Biennial Report. Conflicts between agencies 
would be resolved by the Governor. 
Pro - The argument for a Resource Council points to the 
ever-increasing complexity of resource-related decisions. These 
decisions must be coordinated in a way that allows responsibility 
to be fixed and accountability to be clearly assigned. 
Society's conflicting views on resource priorities will 
complicate decisions affecting resources. For example, the need 
for cleaner air may run counter to the desire for more energy 
development. The Resource Council would provide the coordination 
necessary to arrive at clear decisions in the regulatory process 
while maintaining the integrity of each of the agencies involved. 
As one proponent of this view has stated, "These functions should 
neither substitute nor replace existing decision-making authority 
now vested in the Governor, Legislative and executive branch 
agencies."l 
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Con - The Governor currently has the authority to establish the 
oroppsed Resource Council. ~any of the Council •s functions, however, 
should be performed by the Resources Agency itself. Adding a 
Council on top of the existing departments, boards, and commissions 
is likely only to add to the present confusion and uncertainty. 
One of the problems at which a Resources Council is directed 
is the unilateral action of departments and commissions. To 
leave these agencies with their respective authority does not 
solve the problem of interagency cooperation. This is particu-
larly true of independent commissions not subject to executive 
control. The Council would have no authority to require actions, 
and the Governor would have limited control over many decisions. 
It is far better to require coordination by statute using policy 
as a regulatory instrument than to rely on meetings of a large 
Council to resolve issues. The Resource Council would simply 
add another level of uncertainty to the present process without 
any assurance of affecting energy decisions. 
Separation of Staff Functions 
The Warren-Alquist Act mandates the Chairman to direct the 
staff, subject to the policies of the Commission. One internal 
change is for the Executive Director to be solely responsible for 
the administration of the staff. Variations on this option would 
have both legal counsel and line staff reporting to the Director. 
This change would allegedly provide some separation between the 
functions of the Commission and the staff. The Director, under 
this proposal, would serve at the pleasure of the Commission. 
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Pro - Many have suggested the need for the staff to have a 
greater degree of independence than it now has. Statutes requir-
ing the Director to be responsible for the staff•s activities 
will align the respective responsibilities of the Commissioners 
and staff more appropriately. This change was recently made in 
the Puc•s organization and has had beneficial effects in increas-
ing staff accountability. 
Con - Merely proclaiming the Director to be responsible for 
the staff, however, may not overcome four years of precedent at 
the Energy Commission. The Commission regularly experiences in-
volvement by Commissioners ,-;, - sta.rf ·a-ctivftfe·s~ -a-nd ·this will not 
be eliminated by simply saying it should no longer occur. Argua-
bly, as long as the Commissioners can remove the Director, there 
will not be any sense of staff independence. Commissioners will 
continue to be involved in staff activities. ---
The direction of the staff by the Chairman is necessary 
to provide more political accountability and allow for the Gover-
nor to have influence over what otherwise would be an entrenched 
bureaucracy. Direction of the staff by the Chairman insures that 
policy changes can be effected in a commission form of organization. 
Elected Chairman 
A related proposal is for the Commission to elect its Chair-
person for a specified term from among the member&; the Governor 
currently appoints the Chairman. 
Pro - Changing the present method of selecting the Chairman 
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introduces an element of consensus into the Commission•s proceed-
ings. Currently, the Chairman does not require the support of 
his peers in order to retain the position. Were he required to 
build support among his colleagues, it would promote collegiality 
and more agreement on policy. It could also provide the appro-
priate basis for leadership of a collegial body. 
Con - The Governor•s appointment of a Chairman allows the 
Governor to have some influence over the operations of commissions . 
The Governor would not otherwise have this influence since com-
missioners• terms are fixed, and staggered. The appointed Chair-
man can bring the Governor•s policies into what might otherwise 
be an organization unresponsive to new policy direction. Pro-
ponents of this view point to the recent study of the PUC performed 
for the State Senate, which recommended that the Governor select 
the Chairman of the PUC. 2 
Common Timetable 
One of the continuing problems noted earlier is the multi-
plicity of agencies exercising permit and planning authority over 
some aspect of energy development. These agencies have not co-
ordinated their activities in either the regulatory process or 
the planning process. One method of providing coordination is to 
require, by statute, each of the agencies, such as the ARB, the 
PUC, the SWRCB and others, to become involved early in the process. 
A common timetable for review would require their input into both 
the regulatory process and the planning process on a time-certain 
basis. The ARB, for example, could be required to make a 
121 
determination on air quality during the NOI; the PUC could be 
required to make a financial determination during the NOI. 
These agencies• views and their determinations of feasibility 
would also be required in the Biennial Report. Thus, the Bi-
ennial Report would indicate the likelihood that a particular 
project could meet state and federal standards, and whether suf-
ficient mitigation measures were available. 
This common timetable would require placing the present 
ARB-Energy Commission agreement into statute and would extend 
its operation to the planning process. Also, changes would need 
to be made in the current statutes which require the PUC to issue 
its certificate subsequent to the Energy Commission's decision 
on the AFC.3 
Pro - The above changes are intended to bring all energy-
related agencies into a common framework where decisions can be 
made in a specified time. Many of the resource agencies admin-
ister permit programs which affect energy development projects. 
Unless an initial determination on these issues is made early 
in the process, substantial time and money can be expended with 
no results. Occurrence such as that in the Sundesert case, where 
one agency approves a site and another subsequently makes con-
structiion impossible, should be avoided. 
Con - On the other hand, requiring agencies to finalize 
initial judgments may not increase cooperation. Placing decision 
requirements into statute may produce inflexibility and eventually 
create more mercurial decisions as agencies discover information 
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which alters their initial judgments. The agreement between 
the ARB and the Commission indicates that agencies may be able 
to resolve many problems on their own. 
Resource Planning 
Resource planning refers to the process of preparing to 
meet future electricity needs with appropriate resources. This 
requires that fuel type, capacity, plant type, and perhaps gen-
eral location of new facilities be defined early enough to plan, 
obtain permits, and construct new facilities. Currently, util-
ities perform this function; the state has little or no role. 
The PUC, however, in a recent PG&E rate case, required PG&E to 
produce a resource plan which will emphasize cogeneration and 
other alternatives.4 The Energy Commission•s role in resource 
planning is limited to defining commercially available technolo-
gies and analyzing alternatives to utility proposals. 
There are several possible roles which the state might as-
sume. The state could continue to play little or no role and 
leave resource planning to the utilities. Another option would 
be for state government to provide direction to the utilities by 
formally commenting on their supply proposals. Such proposals 
are currently submitted both to the Commission as part of its 
forecast procedures and to the PUC for rate purposes. There is 
currently no formal mechanism for the state to approve these plans. 
This procedure would increase minimally the state•s current role 
in resource planning. 
The state could also approve resource plans for utilities. 
Under this approach, utilities would submit their proposed plans 
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to a state agency 10 or 15 years in advance of construction. 
The agency would review the plans and discuss them with the util-
ity and the public to arrive at an approved resource plan which 
would be binding on the utility and the state. These plans would 
be reviewed and approved every two years. 
Finally, the state could assume the role of resource planner 
and replicate utility activities in the resource planning area. 
Here, the state would assume the responsibility to plan for meet-
ing future electrical demand by prescribing the amount and kind 
of resources to be used in the future. Such a state-imposed plan 
would be binding upon the utilities. 
Pro - Utilities are regulated to insure that their opera-
tions are performed in the public interest. Utilities are re-
quired to meet the service requirements of their customers, but 
have always maintained that the manner in which they render serv-
ice should be left to their discretion. During the last decade, 
however, approval of facilities has been difficult because 'the 
public's view of preferred resources did not mesh with the util-
ities' view. The only way the state can take an active role in 
electrical policy is to influence the choice of resources in a 
fashion which achieves previously established state policy ob-
jectives. This implies that the state government should be in-
volved early in the planning process to indicate preferred alter-
natives. 
For example, the state's efforts to develop alternative 
energy resources cannot have a substantial impact unless the state 
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has the capability to guide the utilities• investment into areas 
proposed by the state. Cogeneration, in spite of its potential, 
has made little contribution to our electrical resources. Util-
ities have thus far made only limited efforts to exploit this 
potential. 
Although the present regulatory system makes decisions about 
the type and quantity of the resources to be used, these deci-
sions occur at the wrong part of the planning process. Currently, 
the state develops the criteria to determine which technologies 
are commercially available and includes these criteria in the 
Biennial Report. Alternatives to a utility proposal are then 
compared and evaluated in the NOI process, where the final re-
quirements of CEQA, relating to consideration of alternatives, 
are met. The problem is that this test of alternatives comes 
far too late in the process to be meaningful. Thus, the state's 
influence over resource selection occurs when large amounts of 
time and money have been expended on a project. This decision 
should be made earlier in the process when there is time to re-
spond to changes in circumstance or policy. Having the state ap-
prove or sign off on a resource plan would provide a better frame-
work for energy planning. 
Con - Most utilities would object to increasing the state's 
role in resource planning because planning for future needs has 
always been the utilities• responsibility. Utilities have the 
staff, the expertise, and the incentive to plan for future needs. 
Furthermore, the utilities, not the states, bear the responsibility 
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for meeting the public's need for electricity. The public holds 
utilities responsible for inadequate and unreliable service. 
State government cannot maintain the staff necessary to 
perform these functions. Resource planning requires individuals 
with strong technical backgrounds which may require compensation 
beyond the state's capability. The large number of persons neces-
sary for resource planning will also pose a problem since plan-
ning activities require expertise in a number of different dis-
ciplines. 
Forecasting Issues 
The Commission has the responsibility for electricity demand 
forecasting, but the PUC retains its responsibility for forecast-
ing natural gas demand. In forecasting electricity, the Commis-
sion cannot ignore demand for natural gas since for many areas 
natural gas is in direct competition with electricity; an increas~ 
in natural gas demand may cause a corresponding decrease in elec-
tricity use. The PUC's responsibility is to make short-term fore-
casts for rate-setting purposes. Short-term forecast methods may 
not be appropriate for longer term planning. 
One option for altering the present structure is to place 
the responsibility for both gas and electricity in one agency. 
This structure will assure consistency in energy forecasting. 
Pro - Centralizing the entire forecasting function may pro-
vide for a more systematic and complete forecasting capability 
and may save money by avoiding duplication of effort. 
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Centralizing this function may increase the accountability 
for forecast results and provide for greater coordination of 
interrelated forecasting functions. 
Con - The PUC and the Energy Commission use different fore-
casting methods. Furthermore, the forecasts are put to differ-
ent uses. There is no apparent reason for placing all forecast-
ing responsibility on one agency, since short- and long-term 
forecasting requirements are different. 
Conservation Issues 
Both the Commission and the PUC have responsibility for 
conservation programs. ~he Commission administers both standard-
setting and promotional programs. The PUC is responsible for 
reviewing and approving utility conservation programs and expendi -
tures. The Commission presents testimony before the PUC on util-
ity conservation programs and has a larger resource base, both 
in staff and contact funds, upon which to draw. The possibility 
of centralizing the conservation activities of the state in one 
agency may create a more consistent conservation program. The 
question is: Should the Commission or the PUC have this authority? 
PUC: The conservation program conducted by the two agencies 
has resulted in some friction over funding sources and criteria 
for measuring utility efforts. Combining the responsibility in 
one location may increase both efficiency and effectiveness. Load 
management standards, for example, are established by the Energy 
Commission but the rate portions of the standards and utilities' 
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costs for their programs must be met by the PUC. Consolidating 
all programs dealing with utilities could produce more effective 
results if they were the responsibility of the rate-setting 
agency. 
Commission: The Energy Commission has a larger pool of 
talent and experience upon which to draw in such matters as build-
ing design, appliance operations, residential and business out-
reach programs, etc. Conservation programs could be more com-
prehensive and reach a wider audience if total program responsi-
bility were given to the Commission. The Commission should be 
authorized to intervene in PUC cases, as well as municipal util-
ities' proceedings. 
REPLACING THE COMMISSION WITH AN ALTERNATE AGENCY 
There are three basic variations on the option of replacing 
the Energy Commission with another agency. First, there is the 
alternative of creating a Department of Energy to perform all the 
functions now performed by the Energy Commission. Second, the 
functions can be split, some going to existing agencies and some 
to a newly-created agency. Third, all the functions of the Energy 
Commission can be transferred to an existing agency. Although 
each of these alternatives has its own variations, only the three 
basic alternatives will be discussed. 
Department of Energy 
This alternative calls for the creation of a Department of 
Energy, headed by a pleasure appointee of the Governor, to perform 
all the functions now performed by the Energy Commission. The 
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Department, therefore, would be responsible for both regulations 
and administrative processes associated with power plant siting, 
forecasting, conservation, and alternatives development. The 
electricity surcharge would continue to fund the operations of 
the Department, and most of the present Energy Commission staff 
would continue in their positions. 
Pro - The major purpose of moving to a department structure 
rather than a commission is to improve efficiency, accountability, 
and coordination. A commission form of administration tends to 
be slow to act, divides authority, lacks accountability, and is 
a poor structure for managing ongoing programs. The department 
form of administration is seen as solving these problems. 
Departments are more efficient because there is one decision-
maker, not several. The need for hearings or numerous briefings 
on various issues is reduced or eliminated. Budgets can receive 
more expeditious approval; contracts can be executed more quickly, 
and staff will receive clear direction. Business can be conducted 
in an administrative fashion rather than a courtroom setting. 
Debate is limited and decision points clearly fixed. 
Having a pleasure appointee serve as the individual respon-
sible for energy decisions provides a degree of accountability not 
found in plural bodies. Policy directives and decisions can be 
appealed directly to the chief executive and public accountability 
assured through the Governor's power of removal. Since energy is 
a substantial societal decision, decision-makers should be publicly 
accountable. A department structure cannot only respond quickly to 
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changes in circumstances, but can be held responsible if it does 
not respond. Such swiftness of action is needed, especially in 
an area where federal activity is increasing. 
Departments can provide for increased coordination and bet-
ter management of staff resources. Since a department would be 
led by one person, it could formulate policy and interagency 
agreements without the necessary delay and debate encountered 
in a plural body and without the potential for substantial dis-
sent. Because of clear leadership and the absence of a need to 
develop a consensus, staff resources could be more appropriately 
used and priorities established along programmatic lines. There 
would be no need to satisfy the various members of a plural body 
with their 11 pet 11 projects. 
Management in a department setting can operate in a more 
traditional mode through a well-defined chain of command with 
clear lines of authority. There would be no dispersion of authori-
ty nor extensive deliberations over management tasks. 
Con - A department structure also has weaknesses. There are 
some issues which, because of their complexity and controversial 
nature, require debate and deliberation, and where the cultivation, 
and even the necessity, of differing · views is vital to sound 
policy. Power plant siting, for example, is a societal decision 
which must weigh questions of equity and requires the exercise 
of judgment on issues on which there is less-than-perfect knowledge. 
As another example, forecasting future energy demand involves 
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numerous judgmental decisions. In these areas debate is needed 
and dissent should be invited, both of which are limited in a 
department structure. 
While a department structure may be expeditious in decision-
making, it cannot provide the forum for debating essential issues 
and cannot insulate the decision-maker from political pressures. 
Energy decisions have consequences extending beyond the term of any 
particular administration. Indeed, given the long lead times on 
many development projects, the decisions of one Governor may have 
very little immediate consequence during his or her administration. 
Such decisions should be made by a dispassionate body, insulated 
from the political pressures of the day. This body can debate 
the merits of various proposals and be as free as possible from 
undue pressure. 
Energy issues require some degree of consensus if they are 
to have any hope of proving viable. Consensus can only be built 
where there is a forum for debate and a free exchange of ideas. 
Consensus is not developed by the promulgation of rules and regula-
tions by a department. Consensus must be constructed by a plural 
body which reflects many of the views that exist in society. The 
representation and debate of these views provide the necessary 
elements for decisions which must last for decades. 
Functional Split Between a Department and Commission 
This alternative calls for the creation of a department 
to perform some functions now performed by the Commission and the 
131 
transfer of other functions to a plural body. The most familiar 
such proposal is to create a department of energy to perform con-
servation and alternatives development functions and to transfer 
the siting and forecasting functions to the PUC. In essence, this 
alternative requires the division of present Commission functions 
between a line agency and a commission. 
Pro: The advantages and disadvantages of department and 
commission forms of administration were discussed in the previous 
section. The proposal to split the various functions and place 
them in the appropriate type of agency has several advantages. 
Separating the line-oriented program functions from those of a 
regulatory nature prevents the appearance of, and opportunity 
for, bias or conflict among functions, preserves the integrity of 
the regulatory process, and allows the program functions to be 
administered in a more traditional organization. This can achieve 
the best of both worlds by placing functions in the type of agency 
best suited for their accomplishment. 
For example, creating a department for the performance of 
program functions enables the Governor to develop energy programs 
according to his policy and provides a vehicle for their administra-
tion. A commission cannot serve this function _because of its 
independent status. The chief executive needs to act upon his or 
her policies and should be given the tools to do so. The depart-
ment, therefore, provides both accountability and flexibility in 
the administration of energy programs. 
Furthermore, a split along functional lines would allow the 
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regulatory responsibilities now performed by the Commission to 
continue with a plural body. Such functions as power plant siting 
and forecasting are properly those of a plural body. These 
functions require a forum for debate and public discussion and a 
representation of different views. 
Transferring the Commission's adjudicatory functions to the 
PUC has advantages. The PUC has the capability to administer and 
adjudicate these issues since it has experience in the field and 
a history of performing quasi-judicial functions. Responsibility 
for long-term forecasting would be combined in one agency. This 
responsibility is currently divided between the Commission, which 
prepares electric forecasts, and the PUC, which prepares gas 
forecasts. 
Litigation and delays could be limited by the transfer of the 
power plant siting respon&ibility to the PUC. The PUC's decisions 
are reviewable directly by the Supreme Court. This eliminates the 
time-consuming and costly litigation that might otherwise occur 
at the trial and appellate court level and would provide a savings 
to the state and the rate payer by expediting final decisions on 
siting cases. 
Financial analysis, which is the PUC's responsibility, is 
closely linked with development of energy facilities. The issues 
of capital cost and availability, effects of capital expansion 
upon the rate base, and the ability of rates to support new capital 
facilities are all critical issues to new power plant construction. 
Having these issues resolved in one agency will be more effective 
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and will provide more certainty in the regulatory process. Plan-
ning to meet future needs can progress with some assurance that 
the future facilities are capable of being financed. 
Con: There are, however, several disaqvantages to this alter-
native. First, the Warren-Alquist Act purportedly placed respon-
sibility for the four major functions in one agency to insure a 
comprehensive approach to regulation and to provide the motivation 
for alternatives development. Splitting the functions among two 
or more agencies eliminates this goal. In practice, such a 
split will reduce the ability of the state to have any real policy 
impact since regulation is made distant from policy formulation. 
How can policy have any real effect when it has no administrative 
machinery to implement it? Can a Department of Energy ensure its 
policies will be effective when a major portion of their implemen-
tation is carried out by a regulatory agency? Combining the pro-
-- - --
gram and regulatory processes offers both consistency and impact. 
The PUC is not a land use agency; it is an economic regula-
tory body. It has little experience and staff to conduct the 
necessary investigations and reviews for major land use decisions. 
If power plant siting were to be transferred to the PUC, the staff 
of the Commission responsible for this function could be trans-
ferred to San Francisco with the attendant disruption and loss of 
qualified individuals. In a period of declining state expectations 
and reduced ability to attract qualified staff, this disruption 
could be a serious problem. Furthermore, cooperation between 
state agencies has been a problem in the states• energy planning 
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efforts. Placing regulatory process in San Francisco while the 
administrative process remains in Sacramento will exacerbate the 
problem. 
The Commission was created partly because of the public•s 
view that the PUC, when it was responsible for power plant siting, 
was not effective as a siting authority. As stated previously, the 
PUC is an economic regulatory agency. The PUC may be unable to 
balance both economic and land use issues. A question remains 
whether the PUC is better able now than it was in the past to per-
form the siting function. 
Transfer All Energy Commission Functions to PUC 
Thi~ option calls for the transfer of all functions presently 
performed by the Commission to the PUC. This will mean that the 
PUC will be the agency with authori_ty for power plant siting, 
forecasting, conservation, and alternatives development. All 
present PUC functions would be retained and the present member-
ship unaltered. 
Pro: The advantages of this option are similar to those dis-
cussed in the previous section dealing with the split of functions 
between a department and a commission. This would provide for 
greater coordination of the siting and financing decisions since 
both will be made in the same agency. There would be more certainty 
and expedition in the siting process because the decisions of the 
PUC are directly reviewable by the Supreme Court. Forecasting could 
be made more comprehensive by handling both gas and electric demand. 
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Con: This proposal would require a substantial movement of 
staff from the Commission to San Francisco, with all the disruption 
associated with such a move. The present regulatory casework would 
be interrupted as would any legal proceedings in which the Commission 
is involved. There are presently several cases in the siting process 
of the Commission and their disposition would be thrown into confu-
s ion. 
The problems identified in third section of this report 
(analysis of Energy Commission) concerning the accountability of 
commissions, their tendency to be slow to act, their lack of account-
ability, and their inability to make policy and coordinate deci-
sions, will not be solved by replacing one commission with another. 
There is no indication that the PUC is in any better position to 
correct the stated problems than the Commission. This alternative 
would also create new problems for the PUC by combining in that 
agency both regulatory and administrative processes. As stated 
previously, combining these processes has caused difficulties for 
the Commission and will inevitably cause the same problems for the 
PUC. There is little indication that more definitive policy or 
better planning and regulation will result from this proposal. 
REALLOCATlON OF ENERGY FUNCTIONS 
The final category for reorganization is to reallocate energy 
responsibilities among appropriate state agencies. Currently, 
energy responsibilities are administered by the Commission, the 
PUC, the ARB, the SWRCB, and the Coastal Commission. In addition, 
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agencies such as SolarCal, OAT, and the Solid Waste Management 
Board each have responsibility for energy programs. 
There are many combinations that can be devised for a reallo-
cation of energy functions. Three basic patterns emerge from such 
a review, however. First, the siting and forecasting functions of 
the Commission can be allocated to another agency. Second, the 
conservation and alternatives development functions of the Commis-
sion can be allocated to another agency or several agencies. Third, 
other agencies• responsibilities can be transferred to the Commission. 
Transfer of Siting and Forecasting from Energy Commission 
The demand forecast, determination of available technologies, 
and power plant siting are important en~rgy functions. These 
-
.functions could be transferred to the PUC or divided among the 
Office of Planning and Research (forecasting and the Biennial 
Report) and the PUC (siting). The Commission could retain the 
promotional functions of conservation and alternatives development. 
The Commission could participate in the siting and planning process 
of the agencies given the siting and planning authority. 
Pro: The advantages of this form of organization are similar 
to those mentioned under the split of functions in second part of 
this section. Assuming that siting and forecasting go to the PUC, 
this option has the advantages of consolidating: 1) siting and 
rate setting, and 2) gas and electric forecasting. 
Con: The disadvantages of this reallocation are also similar 
to those noted in earlier schemes where the regulatory process is 
137 
disrupted and extensive staff movement is required. In addition, 
the Office of Planning and Research is not an appropriate agency to 
perform the Biennial Report function or the forecasting function. 
OPR is strictly an executive agency and would have difficulty pro-
viding the proper forum for debate and dissent needed for adjudica-
ting the forecast. OPR has an even more difficult task in this 
regard because it is totally within the Governor's office and has 
little or no functional ties with other agencies, an important factor 
in coordination. Furthermore, OPR's staff would have to be expanded 
substantially to prepare the Biennial Report and the forecast. 
Since OPR has traditionally had a small staff, they would probably 
experience severe "start-up" problems. 
This reallocation would leave the Commission administering the 
promotional program of conservation and alternatives development. 
There is little reason for a commission to be responsible for these 
programs. Commissions are inherently less efficient and lack the 
ability to manage staff resources well. These functions do not 
require a five-member, full-time body for their administration. 
Transfer of Program Functions From Energy Commission 
This alternative is the inverse of the previous alternative. 
It removes the program functions from the Commission and transferring 
them to agencies such as the Department of Housing and Community 
Development (HCD), OAT, SolarCal and other line agencies. The 
Commission would retain authority for forecasting and power plant 
siting, making the Commission primarily a regulatory agency. Any 
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agency, or combination of agencies, which already administers 
energy-program functions could receive additional program functions. 
For example, the PUC has responsibility for utility conservation 
and research. HCD has duties in the building standards area. OAT 
and SolarCal are involved with solar energy designs and buildings. 
Those agencies would divide the program activities now performed 
by the Commission. 
Pro: The advantages of separating the program functions from 
those of regulation were discussed earlier in the second section of 
this part. The combination of these programs calls into question 
the integrity of the regulatory process and may blunt the effective-
ness of the promotional programs. Placing these programs in line 
organizations allows the necessary flexibility, speed of action 
and accountability needed to provide leadership in these areas. 
The Governor would be able to make changes in policy and direction 
and could influence new state programs in areas where direct influ-
ence is appropriate. 
Con: The disadvantages of this alternative differs from those 
of creating a department for programs and transferring the regula-
tory activities to the PUC. Here many of the conservation and alter-
natives programs would be fragmented, rather than mutually suppor-
tive. For example, setting conservation standards for buildings 
could be assigned to MCD, but promotional conservation programs 
might be the responsibility of OAT. Separating the programs 
reduces their effectiveness because there are a number of inter-
relationships within each area. Passive solar design techniques, 
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for example, can be encouraged by well-designed building performance 
standards. Separating these programs may result in less effective 
programs. 
Another potential disadvantage to this alternative is the 
disruption it would produce in the present system. Staff from 
the Commission working in the conservation and alternatives area 
would be transferred to several different state agencies; creating 
some displacement and potential morale problems. 
Increased Authority for the Energy Commission 
As indicated earlier, agencies such as the ARB, PUC, SWRCB, 
and the Coastal Commission, all have responsibilities relating to 
energy development and use. These functions, as they relate pri-
marily to power plant siting, could be performed by the Commission. 
The Commission, therefore, could issue the permit for air quality 
in new power plants and determine the ability of utilities to 
finance new facilities. The purpose of the increased authority is 
to create a "one stop shop" for permits for new power plants. 
Applicants would receive or be denied a permit for new plants in 
one agency. There may be conflicts with federal law in some of 
these areas, however. 
The Commission could also assume the present energy programs 
of OAT, SolarCal, and other related agencies. This would centralize 
conservation and alternatives development activities. 
Pro: The desire for a one-stop agency for power plant siting 





been put forward in the Legislature. Its advantages are obvious 
saving time and money. Without the multitude of permit agencies 
to go to, the utilities could expedite construction of needed 
facilities and reduce delays and expenses. Placing these functions 
in one agency may also assist in providing the balance between the 
requirement for new energy facilities and protection of air and 
water quality and increase the efforts to mitigate environmental 
impacts of development. The one-stop shop could also reduce the 
present level of uncertainty that exists with air quality require-
ments and other resource issues. One agency could now make both 
permit determination and provide the early signals on feasibility 
and potential mitigation measures. 
Con: The disadvantages of transforming these functions 
relates to the practicality of making the changes. There is almost 
no way for the Energy Commission or any other commission to repli-
cate all the talents contained in agencies such as the PUC, ARB, 
and SWRCB. These agencies have a staff of experts in the various 
scientific, engineering, and financial matters which are needed 
to perform their program regardless of the power plant work per-
formed by the Commission. Therefore, even if the Commission 
could replicate their talents, there would be duplication of efforts. 
It is by far more preferable to work on a common timetable such as 
that contained in the ARB-Commission agreement. 
There is substantial doubt that if the state provided for 
the Commission to issue permits for air quality or other programs 
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administered in part under federal law, that the respective federal 
agencies would authorize such a move. For example, it is question-
able whether EPA would allow two state agencies to be responsible 
for air quality regulation. Such a transfer is likely to cause 
confusion and may not accomplish anything. 
Each of the agencies discussed above was created to solve a 
serious problem or regulate various activities in the public 
interest. There has been no determination that energy needs are 
any more important than the needs of these other areas. Is energy 
development more important than clean water or air? There may be 
instances where the requirements of energy and other resources con-
flict, but this conflict should not automatically be resolved in 
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